HomeMy WebLinkAbout6-4-14 Applicant SubmittalsTONKONToRPLlP
ATTORNEYS
1600 PIoneer Tower
888 SW Fifth Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97204
503.221.1440
David J. Petersen
Admitted to practice in Oregon and California
503.802.2054
Fax: 503.972.3754
david.petersen@tonkon.com
May 28, 2014
VIA E-MAIL (kevinh@co.descllutes.or.us)
Mr. Kevin Harrison
Deschutes County Community Development Department
117 NW Lafayette Avenue
Bend, OR 97701
Re: Loyal Land, LLC Appeal to Board of Commissioners
County File No. A-14-1
Dear Mr. Harrison:
Enclosed is transcription ofthe hearing on February 4, 2014 in A-13-8. The
transcript is provided as required by DCC 22.32.024.
Thank you and please contact me if you have any questions or concerns.
Sin~reJi:i ../J_ ~~=-=~-~-.;;;:::,..
David 1. Petersen
DJP/djp
Enclosure
0371 J7100001 15569779v 1
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
GREEN Good evening. My name is Karen Green, and I'm the Hearings Officer
for this evening's hearing. We are here for one matter on the agenda,
and this is remand from the Land Use Board of Appeals. Well, I'm not
going to cite the original, original file numbers, but the LUBA number is
2012-042. The underlying land use decision that was remanded is
DR-ll-S. And as I understand it, a new appeal number, Kevin, was
assigned to the remand request, and that's the AI3-S.
KEVIN That's correct.
GREEN Okay. So the Land Use Board of Appeals on January 11,2013
remanded my decision in DR-ll-S, and by a letter dated, I think,
January 2, the applicant (underline applicant) Loyal Land LLC
requested that the remand be initiated, and so that's why we have a
hearing tonight. Is that correct?
KEVIN That's correct, except that the, the letter from Loyal Land designated
David Petersen of Tonkon Torp as the agent of record was received
January 3, 2014.
GREEN January 3. Okay.
KEVIN F or purposes of, of capturing the statutory time line for a County
decision, I think, I believe that January 3 is the correct start date.
GREEN Okay. All right. And as I recall from the letter, there was a question
about the relationship between Mr. Petersen and the underlying
applicant, and you had asked for clarification of that through a letter that
you had sent out on the 1st or 2nd of January. Okay.
KEVIN That's correct.
GREEN All right. And because, that date is important because the statute
requires that a final decision be issued on the remand within 90 days of
the date that the remand initiation request is filed. So that's, that was
when the clock started. Okay. So before I hear from staff and the
parties in this matter, what I want to do is just briefly go over the
procedures that we follow for public land use hearings. There's a few
little different spins on a remand hearing, and I'll talk about those in just
a moment, but basically, the purpose of tonight's hearing is for me to
consider the remand from the Land Use Board of Appeals.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 1 of33
1 .
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
GREEN The order of proceedings will be as follows: I'll open the public hearing
on remand; I'll ask for staff report from Kevin Harrison; and then I will
hear from the applicant, and then from opponents, and under the statute
and County's administrative or development procedures or __. The
only parties to this proceeding are those parties who appeared in the
previous proceeding, which if I recall correctly is just Loyal Land,
Thornburgh, the Thornburgh entity, and Miss Gould and her counsel.
And remind me Paul, was Land Watch a party or was it just Nancy
Gould.
PAUL [Could not hear response.]
GREEN Just Miss Gould. Okay. All right. So the limitation established by
statute and ordinances that only those parties are able to participate in
the remand. So I'll hear from the applicant, from opponent, and that'll
be it, and then I'll have a closing and any closing comments from staff.
To give testimony as always, you need to be at a microphone. So what
I'll do is when I invite you to come up and speak, I'll ask you to come to
the table that's on your right, my left, where there's a microphone, and
there's a sign-up sheet. And before you start to speak, if you please take
a moment put your name and mailing address on the sign-up sheet, and
then before you start speaking state your name and mailing address for
the record.
GREEN Oregon law requires me to make some disclosures, which seem a little
odd in this case because the statute requires that I be the hearings officer
who hears this matter, but I think just to be on the safe side, I'm going to
go ahead and make these disclosures anyway. The first one is whether
or not I've had any ex parte contacts, and that would be contacts between
myself and any of the parties to this proceeding on the merits of the
proceeding outside of the hearing, and I'll state at this time that I've had
no ex parte contacts. My only contacts since my last decision was
issued or have been with County planning staff to set the hearing and
obtain copies of relevant parts of the records. I'm also required to
disclose if I have taken any evidence outside of the hearing, such as at a
site visit, and I'll state at this time, I have taken no evidence outside of
the public hearing, and I have not visited the property in preparation for
the remand hearing, and have not received any other type of evidence
outside of the public hearing. Any party may challenge my
qualifications to act as hearings officer in this matter, even though the
statute requires that I be the hearings body to hear this on remand. If
anyone believes that I cannot be impartial, I believe you still have the
opportunity to challenge my qualifications to act as hearings officer on
this remand, and I'll state at this time, I have no personal interest in the
outcome, have not, and still do not. I believe that I can be impartial.
Does anyone wish to challenge my qualifications to act as hearings
officer on the remand? [slight pause] Okay, hearing none, I'll proceed.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
Page 2 of33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
GREEN Unless I hear an objection, I'll rely on staff's, let's see, you've not done a
staff report, so it'll be staff's oral presentation tonight to list the
applicable criteria as well as obviously the Land Use Court of Appeals
decision on remand listing the applicable criteria On the remand, this
will probably be a good time to tum to the remand procedures and the
County's development procedures or --' which is in Chapter 22-34.
This chapter sets out the procedures for a remand from the Land Use
Board of Appeals or the Court of Appeals. As I mentioned earlier, one
of the restrictions through these provisions is that the only parties to the
remand are those parties to were those persons who were entities who
were parties to the original hearing. The County has done another
notice and we've set another hearing.
GREEN The hearing procedures are those, the same as those that would be
applicable to any other land use matter that is before me on hearing.
Section 22-34-040 of these provisions basically kind of establishes the
parameters of my review on remand. And let me just go over those.
Paragraph A speaks to the issues that are subject to the remand and
those are the issues that were required by LUBA to be addressed. So,
the guiding document for that would be the LUBA decision itself.
Paragraph B speaks to discretion is couched in terms of the Board,
Board of County Commissioners. In previous remand matters, the
County's hearings officers have concluded that although the language
says for the Board, this discretionary provision also applies to hearings
officers when the hearings officer is the entity reviewing the matter on
remand. This gives the hearings body, in this case, the hearings officer
the discretion to allow a modification of the application to address issues
involved in the remand to the extent that any modifications would not
constitute a new application. Paragraph C, which does not make a
reference to the Board, specifically also allows the parties to submit
additional evidence, additional testimony to the extent it is required to
comply with the remand. And ifI determine that additional or ifI'm,
I'm presented with evidence or argument that additional testimony is
necessary for the remand, this provision authorizes the parties to raise
new unresolved issues that relate to that new evidence, and that new
evidence has to be directed toward the issue that L UBA remanded for.
Any issues that were resolved by the LUBA appeal or were not appealed
are not before me on the remand.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A J3-8)
Page 3 of33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (AI3-8)
February 4, 2014
GREEN Okay. So I think that's, that's basically the parameters. I know that the
applicant has submitted an additional piece of evidence and an
, additional, I guess I'd call it a burden of proof statement. I don't know if
Mr. Dewey's had an opportunity to review that, but one of the things that
we'll need to talk about is whether and to what extent I should consider
new evidence that's been submitted by the applicant as well as the
applicant's argument. So I'd appreciate hearing from staff as well as
from the parties on that issue. Okay, so back to my, my general opening
remarks. The failure to address an issue in this proceeding with
sufficient detail for me to understand and resolve it in my decision on
remand may preclude an appeal on that issue should there be an appeal
of my decision on remand. That's what we call the raise-it or waive-it
rule. So any argument, any position that you want to take, any, any
claim that you want to make in the remand proceeding needs to be made
clearly enough so that I can understand it and address it in my decision.
A similar issue or similar rule applies to proposed conditions of
approval that's not really at issue in this case given the nature of the
remand, but a similar issue applies to proposed conditions of approval,
namely that any claim that the conditions of approval are unlawful,
unconstitutional, or exceed the County's authority, etc. need to be made
clear enough before me at this level for me to consider it and address it
in my decision or you may also lose your opportunity to raise that same
claim down the road in a civil action, for example, for damages. Okay.
Any questions about the procedure that we're going to follow for the
remand tonight, the remand hearing? Yes.
DAVID You didn't indicate whether or not the applicant had the opportunity for
rebuttal.
GREEN Yes. I'm sorry. The applicant should have opportunity for rebuttal
following the opponent's testimony. So thank you for bringing that up.
Okay. Any other questions about procedure before we get started?
Housekeeping matters -if you have a cell phone or a pager or anything
that makes noise, rings, please tum it to the non-ring mode or tum it off.
If you have to take or make a phone call during the hearing, hopefully
you won't have to, but if you do, please take it out in the hall.
Restrooms and drinking fountain are down the hall and to your right.
Okay. If there are no questions, further questions, I'll hear from staff.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 4 of33
(,
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (AI3-8)
February 4, 2014
Thank you. For the record, my name's Kevin Harrison with the
Community Development Department, and I have not prepared a staff
report. Just to help perhaps focus the discussion, the remand was based
on the fourth assignment of error, which has to do with Deschutes
County Code, Section 22.36.020, subsection A3. And these are criteria
that need to be addressed in order to determine that a land-use approval
has been initiated. And what LUBA wrote in their decision was the
hearings officer must be able to find both at the 38 conditions of
approval viewed, viewed as a whole have been substantially exercised
and that for any of the 38 conditions of approval where there has been a
failure to fully exercise the condition, the applicant is not at fault. So,
I'm, I'm here to answer any questions to help guide the process alone,
but I don't have anything else to add to that, that direction.
GREEN
KEVIN
Okay. I do have one question I want to pose Kevin to you and to the
parties. The LUBA decision looked at both the, the two sections of the
initiation review, one of which has to do with substantial construction.
Let me get the actual language out. Section 22-36-010, which sets the,
the standard for determining if the development action has been
initiated. The three criteria are [1] that the proposed use has lawfully
occurred; [2] that substantial construction toward completion of the land
use approval has taken place; or (3) where construction is not required
by the approval, the conditions of the permit are approved and have
been substantially exercised, and any failure to fully comply with the
conditions is not the fault of the applicant.
In the applicant's materials, the applicant argues, makes arguments
under subsection 2, which is the substantial construction toward
completion standard. My decision did not address that standard and
specifically found that, that standard was not applicable. And as LUBA
noted, that determination was not appealed, and LUBA proceeded to
review my findings under subsection 3, which is the one that, that you
just described, Kevin. However, on remand, the applicant has submitted
argument and evidence related to subsection 2, and so a question that I
would pose to you and to the parties is in the context of LUBA's remand
and I consider evidence and argument under that subsection where I
didn't consider or rejected that subsection as applicable in the original
decision, and LUBA did not. That was not appealed, and LUBA did not
overturn that or include that in any of the issues on remand. I think that
I perhaps can include findings on that condition in the decision, but it
may be superfluous or inappropriate under the circumstances. So do
you have any thoughts on that? Kevin to start.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 5 of33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (AI3-8)
February 4, 2014
KEVIN I have, I did review the Code section on hearing on remand, and I read
the section to say that the hearings body, other than the Board of County
Commissioners, will hear the remand on the record. The Board of
County Commissioners has flexibility that's not granted to other
hearings bodies to, at their discretion, take new evidence and testimony.
So I, I read a distinction there between different hearing bodies.
GREEN And I did not have time today to go back and find my previous decisions
on remand where that issue came up, but I do recall that I read, I
interpreted that more broadly than just the Board. So your position is
that it just means the Board and that I don't have discretion to consider
additional evidence even if it's related to or necessary for the issues on
remand, that only the Board can do that. Yeah, the Board has to
KEVIN Yeah, that's the way I read that.
GREEN Okay. The reading is strictly to apply only to the Board. Okay. So
generally, it's the County's position that I don't have the authority to
consider additional evidence. If, if I do based on my previous decisions,
what is your thinking on whether I can take evidence and argument on a,
on a subsection that I didn't apply on remand, and that was not, that I did
not apply in the original decision that is not a part of the remand?
KEVIN Well, I, I don't think I can express a County position. I don't know that
this has, this has come up at the stafflevel before. And, frankly, I can't
recall a hearings officer decision that, that ruled on this matter,
addressed this matter, so this is a, for me, this is a case of first
impression of that Code of that
GREEN Of that section?
KEVIN Yeah.
GREEN Okay. Anything else? Kevin?
i
KEVIN No.
GREEN All right. Okay. So I'll hear from the applicant.
DAVID Is this on? Yes, it is. Great.
GREEN If you would just take a minute to sign in on the sign-up sheet before
you start speaking.
i DAVID Actually, I already have.
GREEN You already did. All right. Then just introduce yourself for the record.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 6 of33
I
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
DAVID Great. Good evening. My name is David Petersen. I'm an attorney
with Tonkon Torp in Portland. Our address is 888 SW 5th Avenue,
Suite 1600, Portland, Oregon 97204. I'm here today representing the
applicant, Loyal Land, LLC. And I'd like to start by touching on a point
that Mr. Harrison just raised, which is what is the precisely the question
here on remand? Mr. Harrison characterized it as specifically, the third
prong of the three prong or the three ways in which a land use approval
can be initiated. And I would submit that that's actually not the question
or maybe an overly narrow statement of the question. I believe the
question is really whether or not the conceptual master plan here has
been initiated under sub, subsection A as a whole. And, as, as you
know, there are essentially three prongs or three ways that, that can
happen. The first is whether or not the use has lawfully occurred. The
second is whether substantial construction has taken place. I'm
paraphrasing. And then the third is this kind of long test where if
construction is not required by the approval, the conditions have been
substantially exercised and the failure to fully comply with the
conditions is not the fault of the applicant.
DAVID I'd intended to discuss those three prongs in kind of the order presented
in my letter of January 2, but in light of the preliminary discussion, I feel
I should probably address some threshold questions. I believe you said
just a moment ago that you had expressly found that the substantial
construction prong was not applicable in your initial decision in this
matter. I would dispute that. I don't think there was any discussion in
your initial decision about whether the first or second prongs applied.
I think the, the decision pretty much jumps right into the discussion of
the third prong. Excuse me, and I think that was based in those ball park
quite frankly on the application but, also on, I think pretty much
assumptions that were made by all parties and yourself as well, quite
frankly, that, that the third prong was the only one that would apply
here.
GREEN Let me, let me just stop you for a second.
DAVID
Sure.
GREEN
I'm, I'm looking at page 18 of my declaratory ruling decision, which
addresses these criteria. I think perhaps my, I did make a ruling on this
at least that's certainly what I intended and that's how I read this
beginning at the findings toward the top of the page. No use approved
through the Thornburgh CMP has occurred, and no construction was
required by the CMP. Therefore, there is also finds the applicant must
demonstrate the uses initiate, initiate under subsection A3. So I think I,
I certainly intended this and I think LUBA read this as well as I do now
as saying 2 doesn't apply. And we're looking at 3 also.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 1 of33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
DAVID So as I believe you're probably relying on the phrase, no construction
was required by the CMP. With specifically with respect to prong 2,
and I am assuming that those kind of two clauses separated by commas
kind of address clauses 1 and 2 in order. Clause 1 is the proposed use
has lawfully occurred.
GREEN Right.
DAVID The decision says no use approved has occurred. Clause 2 is substantial
construction toward completion of the land use approval has taken
place. Your clause is no construction was required by the CMP. But
whether or not construction was required is not, is not responsive to
prong number 2. Prong number 2 only says substantial construction
toward completion of the land use approval has taken place. It's entirely
possible that substantial construction towards completion of the land use
approval can take place whether or not it's required to have taken place.
And that is in fact the situation in this particular case where substantial
construction has taken place notwithstanding that it wasn't necessarily
required by the CMP. So I guess I would dispute that.
GREEN Okay. Assuming that, that I'm correct that and, and LUBA correctly
characterized my decision as focusing only on 3, and there's a fairly
extensive discussion in the LUBA decision about why 2 probably
applied and why I probably should have applied 2 but I didn't, and there
was no appeal on that and so they're going to move on to 3. Assuming
that my remand is, is focused on my findings on, on clause 3, can I make
findings on clause 2 in the context of the remand? And you know, I,
you don't necessarily have to answer that right now. I guess that's, that's
kind of the, the, the threshold question with respect to your evidence and
argument about substantial construction.
DAVID Well, I, part of_ to your question, I think it kind of presupposes the
answer. IfI'm understanding your question, you're saying if I'm limited
to on remand to considering prong 3, can I make findings on prong 2?
I would say if the predicate is true, then, then no, you can't, but I would
dispute that, that, the issue on remand is in fact limited to prong 3. And
a number of reasons why I would dispute that and I'd, I'd like to go into
that in, in some detail if I may.
GREEN So I guess for purposes of that, and that's fine, I want you to go ahead
and make your record. I guess it's sort of in the nature of an offer of
proof. If I can't consider this evidence, then I, then I may not be able to
consider what you're going to put on the record, in which you've already
put in the record. Ifl conclude that I can, I'll consider it. Ifl conclude
that I can't, then I simply can't consider that additional evidence.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 80f33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (AI3-8)
February 4, 2014
DAVID Certainly, and so my, my intention today, and I anticipated this was
going to be an issue, but I intended and I'm going to do this and make
my presentation primarily on why you can consider these other two
prongs. With respect to the third prong, I feel that the argument
submitted in my letter is pretty much the argument. I don't want to take
up too much of your time restating what I've written, so I'll probably
pass over prong 3 and at least to my overall presentation except to
maybe in broad terms.
GREEN Okay.
DAVID So I think the issue here about whether or not you can consider either
prong 2 or prong 1 for that matter on remand because I've certainly
referred to it in the shorthand as a question of the law in the case. And I
think the seminal case on this issue is Beck v. City ofTillamook, which
is a 1992 Supreme Court case and, if you're not familiar with the facts,
I'll, I'll briefly touch on them. In that case,
GREEN What's the citation?
DAVID It's 313 OR 148 (1992).
i
GREEN Thanks.
DAVID So in that case, there was an appeal to LUBA from I believe an
approval, and the petitioners raised four particular assignments of error,
four out of five actually, they had lost, in LUBA, they had lost in those
four assignments of error. They didn't further appeal it to the Court of
Appeals. It was returned to the County on remand. The County went
through the remand process, at least I think it was a city in this case.
The city went through the remand process. It went back up to LUBA
and those same petitioners tried to raise the same four assignments of
error again in the second LUBA appeal. And what the Supreme Court
said is, no, you can't do that because those issues were previously
resolved; they were discussed; litigated if you will; resolved; and not
further appealed to the Court of Appeals. And so that, the opportunity
to pursue those claims any further was waived. Beck's not directly on
point here because there really has been no discussion, no argument, no
litigation, and I would contend really no decision with respect to either
the first or the second prongs at any time. I think the applicant and
pretty much everybody has assumed from the outset without really any
significant discussion that this was a prong 3 case.
Transcription of Hearing on Thomburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 90f33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
DAVID There are many cases under Beck that kind of refine the principal. And I
think: some of the other ones are, are a little bit more helpful here. One
would be Shatz v. City ofJacksonville, 113 Or App 675 (1992). In the
Shatz case, the Court of Appeals talks about how the relationship
between LUBA and the local government is really not the same as that,
as an appellant in a trial court. Ws a, it's a, it's a different relationship.
And the language from that case that I think is particularly instructive
here, the Court of Appeals says that a remand only tells the County that
its ground for approval are not affirmable. It does not necessarily to
note that the alternative bases cannot exist and cannot be considered. So
in this edict, just because this had been remanded with, with the
instructions that will maybe category three or other maybe wasn't the
best choice and you really should have done it under prong 2, and you
need to reconsider your decision, that does not mean that these
additional bases can't be brought up.
DAVID A similar case and the last one I'll touch on is specifically, as far as a
case, is Martin v. City ofDune City, 45 Or LUBA 458 (2003). In that
case, the City of Dune City approved a partition based on a particular
criterion. I'll call it a criterion X. LUBA overturned, remanded it back
to the City, and the City permissibly reapproved the partition based on
criterion Y which had not been previously evaluated. And what's
particularly instructive about that case is that LUBA recognized that in
the first, the first time the City heard the partition, they approved it
based on criterion X. They reaIJy had no reason to go on Y. And I'll say
that's very analogous to this situation. You approved this application
based on prong 3. You really had no reason to go on to consider either
prongs 1 or 2. It was sufficient to have approved it under prong 3. So
the
GREEN Remind me. Did the, did the applicant argue under clauses 1, 2 in the
original DR burden of proof?
DAVID No.
GREEN Because it. Okay. So why would that not have been a waived
argument?
DAVID Well, I think that's, I think that kind of goes back to the good question of
the assumption that all the parties were making. By parties, I'm
including the County in that.
GREEN Had you, had you made that argument in your application for a
declaratory ruling, I'm assuming that the staff would have responded to
it as would Miss Gould, and there would have been briefing on that
question and on the question of substantial construction and evidence on
it, which if I recall correctly there is none in the record until what you
submitted with your remand burden of proof.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (AI3-8)
Page 10 of33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
Well, I think there's a distinction to be made between assumptions that
may have been made that, that did not lead to, that eventually that
resulted in these particular bases, alternative bases for approval never
being really evaluated, explored, discussed, considered versus the kind
of the line of reasoning under Beck, which is that, that are issues that are
actually discussed, considered, and resolved, and then not further
appealed that whatever stage in the process _they, the claimant may
choose to not appeal them. That's really kind of the distinction in this
kind of this two sides of the cases that are interpreting Beck. On the one
hand, you have the ones where issues are examined and resolved, not
further appealed; those are waived. In this case, this is more like the
City ofDunes. The situation that I mentioned in Shatz where it's really
never even been thought about or talked about. And the land use
process is different, and the relationship between LUBA and the County
is different than we might be thinking in our heads about the relationship
between a trial court and an appellate court where there's going to be
much more strict restriction on that kind of raising new grounds for
approval on remand.
DAVID
DAVID
So I also want to talk about the, whether you, you can consider new
evidence, which is a question you raised at the beginning. Well, I think
that maybe before I talk about new evidence, I need to talk about
changing the interpretation. So the first time around in your decision,
your interpretation was that construction was not required by this
approval and therefore prong 3 was the applicable prong to examine the
application under. LUBA has certainly suggested rather strongly in its
remand that perhaps a different prong should have been applied. Now,
local governments are certainly are available. It's certainly available to
local governments to change their interpretations, which approval
criteria do and don't apply even during the course of an on-going
proceeding. And the case that I've got for that is Holland v. City of
Cannon Beach, 34 Or LUBA 1 (1998). In that case, the City of Cannon
Beach had made a ruling on a subdivision application without saying
anything either way on one of the listed criteria from the staff report.
That led LUBA to remand it. On remand, the petitioner argued to the
City that since I was last here, you evaluated another subdivision just
fu~~~~~~~~oo~~~~w~~~
this type. And the City said, on remand, well we, we, it doesn't really
matter what we said before. This criterion does in fact apply to
subdivisions of your type, and LUBA upheld that decision. So the
fundamental premise here, and LUBA in fact used the words
fundamental premise, is that the City is free to change its mind on the
applicable approval criteria even in the course of the same case as it was
going up and down between LUBA.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A] 3-8)
Page]] of33
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (AI3-S)
February 4,2014
DAVID Another case is Marquam Farms v. Multnomah County, 32 Or LUBA
240 (1996). In that one, there was two different applications. There had
been a previous application for a nonconforming use.
GREEN What was the case name again?
DAVID Marquam. M-A-R-Q-U-A-M or Marquam Farms v. Multnomah
County. In that case, the hearings officer had made a nonconforming
use determination. Then in a subsequent application by the landowner
for conditional use permit, the County was free to correct the prior
misinterpretation of its own code. What it saw was a prior
misinterpretation of its own ordinance, applying nonconforming use
rules. So I think by analogy, you certainly have the opportunity and
you've even been invited by LUBA to reconsider your application of
only prong 3 and consider prong 2 and apply it to the application.
GREEN You read that as an invitation to consider prong 2?
DAVID Sure. I would read it as an invitation.
GREEN I didn't read it that way.
DAVID So I, I, I, I say all this, and I make this argument all because I'm leading
up to the question of new evidence because we've submitted this, this
affidavit. We're trying to establish substantial construction. And in that
same Marquam Farms v. Multnomah County case that I cited to you,
LUBA held in that case that if a county changes an interpretation of its
ordinance, the applicant must be given a chance to present evidence and
argument in responsive to the new standard. So if, hopefully, you agree
with me that you can consider prong 2, that kind of necessarily triggers
the right of the applicant to provide the evidence, and certainly the
opponent as well to provide evidence that's responsive to that standard.
And I think: that DCC 22-34-040C is consistent with this, which I
believe is as if additional testimony is required to comply with the
remand, the parties may raise unresolved issues. There's nothing in that,
that I think: would prohibit the acceptance of new evidence. Now
Mr. Harrison touched on the question, well, can the hearings officer do
that versus the Board. I believe he was referring to clause A, which
does specifically refer the Board, but certainly, but clause C doesn't say
having any limitation on what entity authorizes the acceptance of new
evidence. So, that's more or less the foundation by which I hope to
establish that we can have the consideration of prong 2.
DAVID I'd like to go into the evidence on prong 2, ifI may.
GREEN Okay. Again, understanding that I may conclude that I can't consider it.
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DAVID Certainly. Of course. So we have this affidavit from Mr. Lindley. He
shows that over $6.8 million has been spent on construction to date.
None of this is just generic, if you will, construction. The expenditures
and the work that's been done has really has no value other than in
furtherance of the proposed resort. There's been about $2.6 million
spent on actual physical construction. There's $1.1 million to build the
BLM access road, $1.4 million for off-site construction of the
community center log lodge which is responsive to a particular
condition of approval that requires a certain minimum amount of money
spent on recreational amenities. Excuse me. I touched on this a little bit
at the beginning. This is a maybe a somewhat unusual situation where
even though the conditions of approval to the CMP prohibit
development without further land use approvals, that's condition number
2 and also the Deschutes County Code provision that establishes the
three-step process for a destination resort, there is the opportunity with
this project to have done construction on land not subject to that, to the
County's jurisdiction, namely the BLM property, and also the expense is
pretty significant money on off-site work. The milling of this log lodge,
essentially pre-assembly or pre-fabrication so it can be assembled on
site. So we have the situation where significant amount of money, $6.8,
almost $7 million has been spent on preconstruction and actual
construction activities, which falls well within the definition of what
substantial construction is. You look at the definition in DCC 22-36,
Code 20B, and to find substantial construction is the alteration of land
directly toward completion of the project, which demonstrates a good
faith effort to complete the development. I think you would be hard
pressed to argue that spending almost $7 million on things that
otherwise of no use is not demonstrating a good-faith effort to complete
this project.
GREEN So, let, let me stop you there just for clarification. I've, I have, I've
assumed and perhaps incorrectly that the work, land work that was done
to which Mr. Lindley refers was done on the privately-owned property,
and not on the BLM properties that. Was that not correct or was it on
both?
DAVID Well, the, a very minor physical bit of work was done on the property.
There was a conversion of an existing house into an office. I believe
Mr. Lindley says 70-odd thousand dollars was spent on that. So
certainly a lion's share was not spent on the privately-owned property. It
was spent on BLM of $1.1 million
GREEN For the road.
DAVID for the road, and $1.4 million off-site to mill this building.
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GREEN Okay. So I guess that just raises a question that I hadn't considered
previously, which is whether the substantial construction has to occur on
the subject property. It doesn't, it doesn't seem to limit it to, so limit it,
but
DAVID But I must admit I didn't consider that question either, but it doesn't say
that in the Code. It says
DAVID & GREEN [They say this in unison.] substantial construction per completion of the
land use approval.
GREEN Okay.
DAVID I think it relates to kind of my point right at the outset about is it
required versus did it occur.
GREEN Uhhuh.
DAVID Now, it may not have been required, but it's occurred.
GREEN So that, it seems that the key phrase is toward completion of the land use
approval.
DAVID Yes. And I, I think it's equally key phrase, if you will, is the definition
and the focus on. I can, can paraphrase it. The full definition says that
the alteration of the land is directed towards the completion and is
sufficient in terms of time, labor, or money spent to demonstrate a
good-faith effort to complete the development.
GREEN This is 36?
DAVID 22-36-020B. I think it was somewhat interesting about that definition is
it talks about physically altering the land or structure for changing the
use thereof, but interestingly in the Tetherow decision that I provided
you, the Planning Department relied not just on what we all kind of
think of as classic construction, physical alteration, but also pre-
construction costs, if you will, design, engineering, and that kind of
thing. And so that's where the $6.8 million number comes from here.
And in addition, the $2.6 million spent on classic, physical construction,
there's significant investment in planning and design and architecture
working towards a tentative plat for the first phase, working on the final
master plan. And those were considered in the Tetherow decision and
should equally be considered here.
DAVID So I'm going to move on to the third prong, the one that I don't think
there's any dispute is available for review on this remand. So the first
two or three times I read the LUBA decision, I, I, I felt like there was,
saying that in your earlier decision, you'd really gone off the rails, if you
will. And the more I thought about it, the more I, I came to the
conclusion that really you more or less did what LUBA wanted you to
do. You just used different terminology. And your decision talks about
which conditions are relevant. And your relevance determination
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depends on pretty much in large part on when they either had to be
performed or what precursors there were before they could be
performed. And that's very similar to what LUBA has said in terms of
evaluating the conditions viewed as a whole as to whether they've been
substantially exercised. LUBA did say that you can consider in
determining whether viewed as a whole the condition has been
substantially exercised, or it's possible to reach that conclusion even if
some conditions have never been touched for that matter. And I don't
want to go into the detail here because I think I do it rather well in my
written materials, but if you look at the conditions that have been
satisfied, it's almost 40 percent of the conditions but, more importantly I
think, it's a 100 percent of the conditions that even could be performed.
And so if a substantial exercise hasn't occurred when you've done.
everything you could possibly do, then I'm, I'm having a hard time
imagining when substantial exercise could occur at all.
DAVID There's also, of course, the second half of the task which is the failure
that fully comply is not the fault of the applicant. It's, it's, it's another
side of the same coin. And as I explain in rather, in some detail in my
appendix, all those conditions that haven't been fully satisfied, it's
because the applicant isn't able to satisfy them. They're barred by the
particular structure of the three-step destination resort process and by the
delays that have resulted from appeals and the wording of the
conditions. And I think if you look at the conditions in a whole, as a
whole, they may make a lot of sense because they fit within the rubric of
the three-step process. And I, and I think the, the ordinance, the Code
provision that talks about the three-step process is really important to
look at and maybe got some short shrift by the applicant the first time
around, for that matter, and that's DCC 18.113.040. That's the, the title
of it is Application Submission. It talks about how you get a permit for
a destination resort. And what's interesting is the very first phrase in
that Code section says, the authorization of a permit for a destination
shall resort shall consist of three steps. A single permit that has three
pieces, not three different permits. And so, what Loyal Land has
essentially is one-third of a permit at this point because it doesn't have
the final master plan. It doesn't have any site plan review for any
portion of the site. And if you look at the conditions, they work the
same way. There are certain things that could be done, but many of
those things can't be done because those second and third pieces of the
permit don't exist. They never existed.
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DAVID That's my last, my segue into my last point which is the application of
the first prong of 22-34-020A, which is that the use has lawfully
occurred. The County is the ultimate arbiter of what its Code means.
That's ORS 197.829. There's certainly, there's limited exceptions when
LUBA is not obligated to affirm a local government's interpretation of
its land use regulations, none of which are applicable here. You know,
LUBA talked in their opinion a little bit about what is the use, approved
by the CMP. And they said the use is a destination resort. They only
said that in the context of determining whether or not they thought
construction was, whether or not construction was not required because
they were considering the application specifically of prong 3, and they
didn't actually ever resolve that question. So I think it's an open
question to the County at this point to resolve exactly what that means.
And I would submit that given the, the three-step structure of the, of the
authorization of a permit for destination resort that really the use
authorized by the CMP is nothing other than the right to file an
application for a final master plan. And that's because as I mentioned
it's consistent with the way the conditions are structured, you know, and
that, and that use lawfully occurred on April 21, 2008, which is well
before the conditional master, a conceptual master plan expired.
DAVID And then lastly, I would say that alternatively, the use has also lawfully
occurred because 100 percent of the conditions of the CMP that could be
satisfied have been satisfied. And to hold that the use requires the
applicant to do something more, this is at the same time prohibited by
the structure of the County Code and the time that it has taken to resolve
appeals on this matter really just wouldn't, would frankly be absurd. If
the, when the applicant has satisfied 100 percent of the conditions and
done everything it can possibly do before it gets the next approval that it
doesn't yet have, it's hard for me to understand how you could say
anything other than the use has lawfully occurred as far as going to the
next step. And that's the end, the end of my comments.
GREEN While you were speaking, I was just refreshing my memory about what,
how Title 18 defines use in 18-04-030. Alphabetically, down at the end,
it's very quick. I'll read it to use. Use means the purpose for which land
or a structure is designed, arranged, or intended or for which it is
occupied or maintained. So it, your argument about the CMP, the
three-part permit, it doesn't fit precisely within that definition, not as
neatly as say a conditional use permit to operate a use like a hotel.
I understand your argument.
DAVID Yeah, and I guess my response would be that, that the definition of use
is going to be applied in many, many, many contexts, and a destination
resort is a very specific approval that has a very specific four-paragraph
Code provision. And the specific would control over the general.
I suspect that definition may be is older than the concept
,
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GREEN Oh, I'm sure.
DAVID of a destination resort and doesn't contemplate such a complicated
GREEN Goes back to 1979, no doubt, the first design work that's probably, so.
Yeah. It's one of many things that doesn't always fit exactly with more
modem provisions.
DAVID Yes. I suspect it didn't contemplate this kind of situation.
GREEN Nope.
DAVID Unless there's any othet questions, I'll let Mr. Dewey have
GREEN I don't have any at the moment. So thank you Mr. Petersen.
DAVID Thank you.
GREEN Okay. I'll hear from opponent.
PAUL Good evening. Paul Dewey representing Nancy Gould. 1539NW
Vicksburg, Bend 97701. The first, and I won't repeat all that I've written
in here as well, but our first issue is actually the scope of the remand
because we too believe you ruled on page 18 and, in fact on the latter
issue of whether or not the use has been initiated, you state very clearly,
no use approved through thc Thornburgh CMP has OCCUlTed. And, and
actually the L UBA a couple of times referred to the use as being the
destination resort. So we believe that, well I'm getting ahead of myself.
First, go back to whether or not we're even having addressing.
GREEN Prongs 1 and 2.
PAUL Prongs 1 and 2. I was reading the language of the Code more narrowly
than you were suggesting, I guess more like Kevin was, and because the
Code does shift terms. It's at that point, it refers to the hearings body
and then it refers to the Board and under the, you know, classic PGE
analysis.
GREEN Right. Text in context to
PAUL Because you're using different
GREEN Right. And, and actually I need to, I need to step back and correct
myself. As we were talking about this and I looked at that language
again, I think my previous decisions related to the third piece of that
scope, remand scope provision, not the part that refers to the Board
which has to do with modifying, but the third part that has to do only
with taking new evidence. And I think in the decisions that I'm
recalling, I've said that because there's no reference to the Board or the
hearings body in that third piece having to do with new evidence that as
if the remand goes to the hearings officer, the hearings officer has
authority to allow new evidence as opposed to what I said earlier, which
was that the second piece having to do with modifying, it goes beyond
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the Board. So I think, I, I misspoke. What I meant to say was that
I have interpreted the third piece having to do with allowing new
evidence to come in to apply to any hearings body, not to the Board,
because it doesn't refer to the Board specifically. So, sorry for any
confusion. I think I just misspoke as to what I recalled from those
previous decisions.
PAUL And my response to that is that they're not unrelated -one and three.
And in fact, see
GREEN Right. They can be related.
PAUL If additional testimony is required to comply with the remand, and
I believe then, that is (a) on remand, the hearings body shall review
those issues that include required to be, to be addressed. So we just
disagree with what that interpretation is.
GREEN Right. Right. So if the, if the scope if as Mr. Petersen argues, the scope
includes all three pieces, all three prongs, then I would be able to, under
the third piece of the remand, scope section having to do with new
evidence, I would be authorized to allow new evidence if it was
necessary to address the remand. If the scope of the remand is only
prong 3, I would still have authority to allow new evidence if it's
required to address the remand issues with respect to prong 3.
PAUL Right.
GREEN So those are kind of the two, the two options, but they all come back to
the threshold question of how, how broad is the remand.
PAUL Right.
GREEN How broad are the issues on remand?
PAUL Yeah. And
GREEN So your position is that we're, we're focused on prong 3.
PAUL Right.
GREEN And reconsidering and redoing the findings
PAUL Right.
GREEN Making new findings on prong 3.
PAUL I think, I think we are at this point. If this was at the Board level, then
they obviously have discretion perhaps, although
GREEN To allow a modification that would
PAUL Right.
GREEN Would that actually be a modification though? I'm not, I'm not sure
what the
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PAUL Well, I don't know in, in, and, you know, and again, I look at the
language of your decision, and, and you did make determinations on
these and they weren't appealed, and so I'm wondering whether under
the law, the case even the Board
GREEN That was, I guess that was my question to Mr. Petersen, and I even
looked at those.
PAUL Even the Board could do it. Yeah.
GREEN Whether the Board could do it and it or it have their discretion. Yeah,
and I don't know, and I guess I think of a modification on remand as
something different from expanding the, the theories on the same use.
I've, I've thought more of a modification as kind of a change in the use,
but I haven't, I haven't given it that much thought here in the context of
this case.
PAUL Okay. Could I back up just a moment? You mentioned at the very
beginning that Loyal Land had submitted an addition or supplemental
burden of proof.
GREEN I called it a burden of proof and that may be inaccurate. What I was
referring to is there's a letter dated January 2 from Mr. Petersen to Nick
Lelack.
PAUL Yes.
GREEN And then that had attached to it the affidavit of Mr. Lindley and, sorry,
Appendix 1 to the letter to Mr. Lelack, also dated January 2, which
I called a burden of proof because that's basically what it looks like. Is
that a document that you've seen?
PAUL Yes, that I've pulled the County website. It had a number of attachments
here, your earlier decision
GREEN Right.
PAUL The LUBA decision and
GREEN Right.
PAUL I just want to make sure that there wasn't something new.
GREEN Something else. That's the, Appendix 1 is really the document that I
was referring to. Mr. Petersen.
DAVID Were you thinking of the January 3 letter which is really just an
authorization from me to represent Loyal Land.
GREEN Okay. And yes, there is an additional letter Mr. Petersen referred to that
clarifies his, his relationship with Loyal Land in response to Kevin's
January 2 letter asking who, who the applicant is and whether there's a
match between the remand, requestor, and the applicant. But when I
spoke about the burden of proof, I was talking about Appendix 1 to the
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letter. Okay?
PAUL Okay. But given that objection, I will briefly, and, and I do address A2,
A 1 as well as A3 since you might rule that, that could be considered in.
I would just like to emphasize that I believe that substantial
construction, and it's defined in 22-36-020B really does mean the site
not, not offsite. It states substantial construction has occurred when the
holder of the land use approval has physically altered the land or
structure or changed the use thereof.
GREEN You're thinking the land means the land subject to the permit?
PAUL Right. And which makes sense in terms of whether or not its use has
been initiated by construction, and the use here is the destination resort,
and actually in the VRE decision that the applicant refers to which is an
administrative decision, they were talking about a final plat in the roads
that were in the, in the, the final plat not off-site facilities that they might
be constructed.
GREEN So, but, as I was reading this, I was thinking it's kind of, it, it resembles
in some respects of vesting standard, you know, a substantial
construction to vest.
PAUL ~it's being argued here is sounds
GREEN And you're saying it's
PAUL Sounds like vesting, but
GREEN But vesting would be broader potentially because it could include other
expenditures. There's not the, the language is a little different in
common law vesting cases, I think, at least from recalling some of the
cases I did under Measure 49. I don't think any of those involved
off-site improvement, but I think, I've, I've interpreted homes, the homes
test and so forth to be pretty broad.
PAUL Right.
GREEN In terms of, you know, the amount of expenditure and the level of
expenditure based on the overall expenditure for the development,
which could theoretically include off-site improvement So you're
saying you don't think off-site improvement expenses, either land
clearing or milling, is the, is the case here. Milling for a building would
count. It has to be construction on the site itself.
PAUL Right. The, the initiation of use is of the, the permit I mean there's no
permit here to go on to BLM land and, and billed, you know. The
permit we're looking at here and whether or not it's been initiated is that
which allows construction on, on the site. That's what the conditional
use permit, the final master plan, all of that is, is focused. And so
whether or not there's
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GREEN There's a condition of approval specifically referring to the, the access
through BLM land is, is part of what the applicant is required to do to
make the destination resort work to get approval. So in that situation,
since that's part of the approval itself would it not be reasonable to argue
that expenditures, that certainly an expenditure toward the approval
because it's part of the approval, part of the required approval.
PAUL And, and that might be considered in, in terms of the conditions of
approval
GREEN Prong 3.
PAUL Prong 3, but in the language of A2 and the definition of substantial
construction, we don't believe that, that, that really, that really applies.
And, we're all, you know, it's kind of difficult in this 90-day remand
time period, but at the, you know, there's just no evidence here other
than Mr. Lindley'S affidavit of these summary statements about
expenditures incurred of what was actually spent on what, and a lot of
the expenditures here appear to be planning expenditures that were
done.
GREEN preparation
PAUL Pr~paralion for the application in the first place and the, again, the, the
focus of the substantial construction prong is on an effort to complete
the development. If, if all that one needs to do to satisfy the substantial
construction test is expend all the money on an application, in the first
place, that would, that would really defeat the whole purpose of this, of
the, of the test because everyone could qualify because they spent
money preparing an application, planning, but they then do the
GREEN Well, it would still though come down to, to what's substantial. I mean,
again, kind of thinking of the vesting cases, like I've probably looked at,
I don't know, probably 8 or 9 or 10 maybe, where part of the
expenditures presented as evidence of meeting the Holmes test included
preparation expenses, some of which were not directly, sometimes
would not be directly related to the proposal like a subdivision. It would
something unrelated to that and others that were directly related to the
proposal. And I've always assumed that those are relevant, but they may
not be sufficient to be substantial, which are two different questions.
Do you, do you get to count them? And then, if you do, are they
significant enough to be substantial?
PAUL Right.
GREEN So you're saying you wouldn't even get to count them because of the
reference to the land in this substantial construction definition.
PAUL Yeah. Yeah. Physically altered the land or structure or change the use
thereof, so no, I believe we're arguing this.
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GREEN That language limits it to the, the land that's subject to the pennit itself,
and not land that's subject to a condition of the permit, such as the BLM
land.
PAUL Right. And construction or altering or changing the, the use thereof.
Right. Let me see if there's anything else. And I don't think there's any
dispute. They acknowledge that this was off, off site. I might briefly
address A3. The applicant. First of all, the applicant states that viewed
as a whole standard that LUBA raised, but if you'll look at LUBA's
decision, it doesn't say, thou shalt use the, view it as a whole. It says,
you could decide either each one should be substantially exercised, and
so that's a decision, that's an open decision for you to make and
GREEN y I read it, that it was an alternative.
PAUL Right.
GREEN Analysis, a means of analysis under prong 3.
PAUL And so we've made an argument for why it should be each, not viewed
as a whole. Or in the alternative, if it's viewed as a whole, why that
doesn't apply.
GREEN ..1.
PAUL Because so many, so few of the conditions have been satisfied, but even
more importantly, the really significant conditions that are related to the
advancement of the, of the, of the project, that is, you know, the final
master that are based on the final master plan or tentative plan, the, the
50 units that come in, the $2 million that should be spent on something.
What, what, what the applicant is focusing on are conditions as simple
as correct a math error that was involved in the CMP or put on a map
where certain lines are or show on a map where the open space is. If
there's going to be an analysis of, of, viewed as a whole of the
conditions of approval, there needs to be some way to give it to, to them.
GREEN Uh huh.
PAUL And the, and the bottom line here, and actually I might just go ahead and
jump to, to the fault aspect of this is because the applicant so often relies
on the fact that there was no final master plan approval, so it really
couldn't do many of the things contained in the conditions of approval,
but something we have often wondered is why the applicant didn't
initiate remand proceedings on the, on the final master plan, that is after
the Court of Appeals made their decision. I think it was in April of
2010. The two-year period here for the expiration of the permit didn't
expire for another year and nine months. And now, and now we're four
years later, and there's still no attempt or no initiation of remand. And
this isn't something the County controls or, or my client. It's something
completely under the control of the applicant to initiate remand
proceedings. And so, we don't believe it's appropriate for the applicant
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to argue that they're somehow hamstrung or have been and are excused
from performing all these conditions of approval because they didn't
have a completed FMP, when it was within their power to initiate
remand proceedings, but they've just let that, let that drift. That's, that's
the fault of, of, of the applicant.
PAUL The other argument that's often made in the applicant's materials is that
the appeals that were filed in this case made it impossible for them to do
what they wanted to do within the two-year time period. But do recall
that County Code actually tolls the running of the, of the two-year
period for appeals until they're all resolved. And so the two-year period
here ran for four or five years. I mean, they weren't prejudice at all by
the appeals.
GREEN Well, I, I believe that the evidence submitted by the applicant on that
prong, and I believe it actually there was evidence to this effect in the
original record although I'd have to look at it, has to do with economic
conditions that occurred during that period of time.
f-P_A_U--:L.,---,:-_____~a, that's a separate issue, and I, I will address that as well.
GREEN But it, but I think it goes to your point of, you know, if it's under the, the
appeals were not under the control of the applicant fully. Those were
under the control of your client to some extent, under the control of
State entities that were determining when and how things were going to
be processed, and time elapsed during that period of time, and economic
conditions changed. Other conditions changed during that period of
time.
PAUL But they weren't, they, they didn't stop. If you look into the record when
the conceptual master plan was on appeal, they went ahead with the
application for the final master plan
GREEN For the final. Right.
PAUL
approval. And they, and then they got the remand. The problem here
again is with not the appeals, there is no stay of these proceedings.
Things progressed as fast as they wanted to progress. And the fact is
that once the remand happened on the FM, on the FMP, nothing, the, it
just wasn't initiated again.
GREEN Well, I, I understand your argument. I, I'm looking at the LUBA
decision again today. I, I was struck by. Well, there was a term that
was used, not with respect to the, the multi-pronged conditional use for
destination resort process, but LUBA talked about some sort of
metaphysical exercise. I think it had to do with what the LUBA just the
conditions of approval or the representations that LUBA said no, those,
those don't count. I, in reading this decision, as a whole, I felt like we
were in a metaphysical exercise because of trying to fit the three prong
or the three part conditional use or a destination resort approval process.
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To fit that within the, the requirement to include conditions of approval
and the sort of construct that the County hearings officers have used
since the earth cooled about laying out conditions of approval out into
the future, you know, what happens now and what happens six months
from now, and what happens a year from now, and then taking the
language of the initiation standards in the County's Code and trying to
fit those three things together, and they don't fit. And while I understand
your point, I think LUBA also pointed out pretty clearly that it is, it's
difficult to make this work. As probably what's intended by the County
or by whoever drafted this, given how the decision was written, given
how the conditions were written, given how the initiation provisions are
written, and given this multi-stage process where you can have an
appeal going on as was the case here, an appeal ofthe conceptual master
plan, and then something going on with the final master plan, one of
which is contingent on the other. I mean, it's just, it's like this, this sort
of endless, you know, Rubick's cube of how do you get all these pieces
to fit together in a timely way, not to mention what's going on as time is
passing. The market may be changing. Economic conditions may be
changing. It's, it's, it's not a simple whose fault is it. It's. I think LUBA
made clear this is, there's a whole lot of factors that go into how these
things are handled, mUltiple appeals, multiple stages that can be
appealed.
PAUL Right, but, but if the process isn't stopped during the appeals, and the
process can move forward as it did
GREEN Uhhuh.
PAUL That they, too much is being made of the appeals, and those appeals
didn't stop anything. What stopped everything was the failure to initiate
the remand on the FMP. That's what stopped everything, and, and they
had plenty of time - a year and nine months -to do the FMP.
GREEN What WOUld, what would have been the
PAUL And the results. There was also no, no extension request.
GREEN What would have been the effect? Let, let's say they had done what
you're proposing and gotten the FMP final approval? And then, we're in
the initiation, the question of the initiation of the conditional or of the
conceptual master plan, which if that's concluded, if the conclusion is
that, that has expired, then there can't be any final master plan approval,
because it's contingent on the conceptual master plan being approved.
So would it not be prudent for an applicant to establish the validity of
the conceptual master plan before, trying to get the final master plan
approval?
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Page 24 of33
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February 4, 2014
PAUL Oh, I, I wouldn't think so. I mean, and, and here, they certainly didn't
think of doing that. They just, they just, you know, stopped. I mean, of
all the other resorts that they just go on CMP, FMP, tentative, tentative
with plat, final plat and then, and then there's no question about whether
or not construction has been initiated or use has been initiated. And if
there is, then, you know, there's next, usually, this argument about
economic situation arises for extensions. That's where I've seen it
mostly, and then that's what. If that had been necessary, that could have
been done.
GREEN Well, there were extensions applied for as I recall and granted. Were
there, were there not a couple of extensions granted, and those were also
appealed?
!
PAUL No. Well.
GREEN I recall at least one and the appeal of the extension was, was withdrawn.
Wasn't there
PAUL There was an extension granted administratively, and it was appealed.
GREEN Right.
PAUL It went to hearing.
GREEN And then it was withdrawn?
PAUL And eventually it was withdrawn.
GREEN Right. Right.
PAUL But, it, yeah. Yeah, so there
GREEN It's a complex. I guess my point is it's a complex process.
PAUL It is a complex process.
GREEN Standing by itself.
PAUL It is a complex process, but if you were. I don't know if this is in the
record. I assume it, I don't know. I'll have to check, but, you know, the,
the findings, a conceptual master plan was, was, the conditions of
approval, as I understand, were, were drafted by the, by the applicant.
And, and it, it,
GREEN That's, that's not unusual.
PAUL No. It's no un, unusual, but it's. I think LUBA's point is, is well-taken.
The conditions of approval were drafted in this way. And jfthere was
concern about that, then they should have been drafted in a, in a
different way than they were.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
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February 4, 2014
GREEN Had, had, had hearings officer Briggs known what was coming, she
probably would have written them a different way. I think the way they
were written was the way the hearings officer have written the
conditions of approval since time in memorial laying out a chronological
pathway [(?) someone coughed loudly] for what comes first, what
comes second, and so forth. And, and obviously with respect to
destination resorts, that it didn't, it doesn't work as well. That, that
model doesn't work as well.
PAUL On your point, is the economic, economic down tum, there's also one
reason given in the applicant's materials for why this didn't happen, but
if you look at the CMP, and we've cited the pages, this is some five or
six pages of the fmdings of the County concern the financial ability of
the applicant to build the resort, and.
GREEN As of that time.
PAUL Right. With, with, with, and it's substantial, and it's, and it's detailed.
And so, you know, it's one thing if, if the economic
GREEN That's, that's a different. I mean, the applicant has to show the ability,
the financial ability to carry this out, but that's I think a separate question
from whether the applicant would choose to based on economic
conditions in terms whether it would pencil out or not. Those are, those
are separate questions, and the fact that you just say we have the money
to do this doesn't necessarily mean that the time is right to do it. I don't
think one necessarily follows from the other.
PAUL Yeah. Although, if, if one can just choose because of the, one's financial
situation not to initiate a use because they don't, don't want to do it at
that time. What's the point?
GREEN Well, they run the, they run the risk. They run the risk that Loyal Land
ran, which is that if they, you know, depending on how much they've
done, they may find themselves in exactly the spot they're in now, which
is trying to argue that they did enough under the circumstances. That's
the risk they take.
PAUL Right.
GREEN That they may not have done enough in hindsight to initiate the use.
• PAUL I think everything else, I've, I've addressed in, in the written materials.
I GREEN Okay, which I look forward to reading and, obviously, haven't read yet.
Okay. Let me see if the applicant has any oral rebuttal.
DAVID I do.
GREEN Okay.
DAVID I'll be very brief.
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Page 26 of33
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February 4, 2014
GREEN Okay. And then I'll hear from Kevin and then we'll talk about a, a
post-hearing schedule.
DAVID David Petersen again. So I always find rebuttals to be kind of longer
than this list of bullet points, but that's how it kind of ends up
happening. I would go on to repeat the request that we leave the record
open to have the opportunity to respond to the memorandum we were
provided. I want to make sure. This is the distinction I focus in my
letter, but I do just want to highlight it for you, and that's the distinction
between full compliance with the conditions and full performance of the
conditions. The Code provision talks about, in the clause about fault
talks about failure to fully comply. We make the point in our Appendix
that in fact every condition has been fully complied with because to the
extent that there was the opportunity for performance that has occurred
and, in every other respect, the opportunity for performance is not
available. So therefore, we're still in compliance because ifyou, if you
performed the condition before it was permissible, that would, that
would essentially be noncompliance. So I think that as a, as a threshold
matter, there's really not even a need to evaluate fault, and we've
certainly got into some questions about if evidence about fault, an
argument about fault as a back-up plan, but I think the evidence is in the
record certainly to make a finding that there has been full compliance
with every condition, and fault does not need to be evaluated.
DAVID The, the suggestion that the definition of substantial construction is
limited to construction on the site. Well first off, I disagree with that for
the reasons I made in my opening presentation, and I don't think that's
what the Code provision says. I did forget to mention, however, that
there was $800,000 roughly in golf course work, which is mentioned in
Mr. Lindley's affidavit and some of that is land-clearing on the site as
well.
GREEN How much of it is? Do you know?
DAVID That's a question I'd have to answer for you outside of these
proceedings. I don't know the answer to that. And I believe you pointed
out that the BLM road is required by the conditions. The lodge is also
required by the conditions in a, in a generic sense. The condition
requires them to spend, I believe
GREEN Overnight lodging
DAVID Yeah. $2 million in 1984 dollars on recreational amenities, which is
going, that's probably is going to be a significantly larger number than
$2 million today. So even without the planning costs, even though the
Tetherow decision did in fact use planning costs towards the substantial
construction determination, even if you carved them out, there's still
going to be a substantial amount of money spent on classic construction
activities. You touched briefly on the question of whether the vesting
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A I 3-8)
Page 27 of33
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February 4, 2014
analysis under Holmes might be appropriate here. My recollection of
Holmes, and it's been awhile, is that Holmes
GREEN That's actually changed with the, I can't think the name of the case, but
the Supreme Court modified Holmes in a case about a year ago.
DAVID Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. My recollection is that applies a kind of a
percentage test like
GREEN Well, it, it does although it they've said don't, don't spend too much time
on the percentage test. Look at all of the criterion overalL
DAVID Well, I guess the point I would make here is the construction that's
allowed by the conditions of the CMP is actually nothing. So, so any
construction is going to, it's going to blow a percentage test out of the
water because you're taking a percentage of zero.
GREEN And, I guess that, this is question that's kind of floating around in my
head which is to what extent does substantial construction have to be
viewed in the context of what is permitted under the approval?
DAVID Yeah. It does present a little bit of a logical merry-go-round, doesn't it?
GREEN Yeah. There's a little conundrum because if you can't even move dirt on
the site until you have final master plan potentially or something, how
much is substantial? Is it substantial in the context of what you're
permitted to do or is it substantial in some sort of broader context of
what the overall cost would be? I mean, it's just one of these pieces that
doesn't fit as neatly.
DAVID Sure. I appreciate the conundrum, and I've, I've struggled with it
somewhat myself. I guess that what I would say is this is a somewhat,
well maybe I don't know how unusual it is, but the conditions do
expressly contemplate construction off, off off site at a BLM road at the
very minimum. So I think that's what happened
GREEN Well, overall, that's a relatively small percentage of the overall
construction for the resort, if you look at everything that has to be or is
proposed to be constructed, it's a relatively small piece of it.
DAVID Yes, although in absolute dollars, it's a significant amount of money.
And in the Tetherow decision, there wasn't this percentage-of-the-pie
approach. And I would also point out that it's pretty much everything
that they could do, given the limitations of where they were. So you
could certainly, you could say it's 100% of the construction that was
available.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 28 of33
.,"".
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
GREEN But again, this, this initiation of use, I think, also I would guess predates
the destination resort provisions of the Code. So it was probably drafted
with much simpler land~use approvals in mind, I would think, and, you
know, Kevin, you may want to weigh in on that, but it's, it's again one of
these pieces that doesn't, where the destination resort process and, and
construct doesn't fit as neatly within some of these older provisions of
the Code.
DAVID The last thing I want to do is respond this question of why hasn't there
been an FMP remand initiated by the applicant. I hope this is in the
record but, it's, I suspect it is, but for a long time, it was impossible to
request an FMP remand because kind of the central issue of the FMP
remand, as I understand it, was where wildlife mitigation would occur.
GREEN Uhhuh.
DAVID And that required BLM to make some decisions about where it could
take place, and that didn't happen until mid-2011. And then the
initiation application was filed on November 1,2011. So we're really
talking about a, maybe there's a four to five month window in there
where it even conceivably could have been, or would have made any
sense whatsoever to request a remand. And then I also, I want to blunt
the risk of minimizing the severity of the economic downturn that we're
relying in part on for explaining why the project wasn't moved forward
with the speed that maybe Mr. Dewey thinks we should have moved it
forward with. I mean, those are some pretty scary numbers that I've
provided in my brief in terms of really how this region suffered. And
I'm, I'm sure there are developers and other businesses much more well-
capitalized than Thornburgh Resort Company that didn't survive. So,
you know, there's some pretty significant unprecedented, kind of
economic damage that, you know, really cannot be blamed on the
applicant. It's obviously a result of global factors and, you know, very
complicated analyses that don't, that the applicant has no control over.
That's, that's all I have.
GREEN Okay. Thank you Mr. Petersen.
DAVID Thank you.
GREEN Okay. Kevin.
KEVIN I don't have any specific comments except the relationship in the,
between the timing of adoption, the destination resort ordinance, the
initiation of the use section of the Code. I suspect that the destination
resort ordinance came first early.
GREEN Oh really. Okay.
KEVIN Early '90s.
GREEN Okay.
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February 4, 2014
KEVIN And it was driven by Eagle Crest to make use of the collate language.
The initiation of use language I think came sometime later.
GREEN Okay.
KEVIN But I suspect that when this was written, because of the unique
development process that's associated with destination resorts that this,
there's probably some unintended consequences here as to how this
procedure could relate or would relate to a destination resort. So that's
GREEN So you're saying the initiation piece was prompted by issues that came
up with respect to Eagle Crest and its phasing and
KEVIN No. I think that the desire to put this initiation of use language in the
Code was driven by a, a, the desire to, to have some means of vesting, if
you will, with projects not, not related to destination resorts per se,
GREEN Right. Okay.
KEVIN But to more standard types of development projects.
GREEN Okay, which was my assumption that I had the timing off.
KEVIN Yes.
GREEN Okay.
KEVIN And so I think we're dealing with some unintended consequences
because the destination resort development process is different, so
different than any other project that we normally say.
GREEN Right. Okay. I, I don't, I doubt that there have been many initiation and
use questions with respect to destination resorts, and I may be wrong
about that. Have their been others besides Loyal Land and Thornburgh
that you're aware of?
KEVIN The VRE decision, that's
GREEN That's
KEVIN That's cited in this
GREEN Okay.
KEVIN In this record.
GREEN That has an administrative approval based on that analysis. Any, any
others besides VRE?
• KEVIN I can't think of any .
GREEN Okay. Okay. All right. Anything else Kevin?
KEVIN No.
GREEN All right. I'm going to go ahead and close the oral testimony on remand
and talk about the post-hearing schedule.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 30 of33
('.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
So we are approximately 30 days into the 90-day time frame, if I recall,
if I'm doing the math correctly,just about exactly 30 days. I'm
anticipating whatever decision I issue will be appealed by somebody.
The Board mayor may not hear it, but we need to at least allow enough
time for the Board to have an opportunity to hear it. So help me with
the math on that working back from the 90th day and the time frame for
the Board, you know, to receive an appeal and set a, set a meeting at
least to decide whether they're going to hear it or not. Would that be a
30-day process, do you think? I'm trying to figure out how much time
I have between now and the bottom line to get something to the Board in
the 12-day appeal period.
KEVIN So if we rough the calculation right, 90 days is April 3rd.
GREEN I think I figured it was April 2nd. Well, let's be conservative and say it's
April 2nd.
KEVIN I think the Board, ifthe Board had 30 days.
GREEN After the appeal is filed.
KEVIN Yes.
GREEN Or after the 12th day.
KEVIN Right.
GREEN Okay. So then, we've got to add 30, got to add 12 to 30, that's 42 days
back. So that leaves me only about 3 weeks to be on the safe side for
the record to be opened and for me to write a decision. And I think I
have to leave the record open at least 7 days by statute, and the applicant
has 7 days for argument, so there's 2 weeks right there. So it's tight.
KEVIN It's tight.
GREEN It's very tight. Okay. All right. So in light of that, my usual 3-week,
you know, opening evidence, rebuttal evidence period, and then a week
for final argument we may not have time for. So what I'm thinking is I,
I want to have at least a week in this initiaL I want to have at least a
week for you to be able to respond to Mr. Dewey's and for both staff and
Me Petersen to be able to respond to Mr. Dewey's memorandum and for
Me Dewey to review anything else in the record that, that he wants to.
And speaking of the record, I'm assuming the record would include
everything that came in, in the initial [somebody coughed and
covered her voice] declaratory ruling.
KEVIN DR-II?
GREEN DR-II, whatever is, that record plus whatever has come in now.
KEVIN I have the entire record sitting in my office.
GREEN And is it. So here's the question about that. Should, are we, are we
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
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February 4,2014
looking at the LUBA record as the record? Is that, does that make sense
to treat the LUBA record as the record of DR-ll-S and then the remand
record would be everything that came in after that? Does that make
sense since the LUBA record is already put together? Would we, would
we lose anything if we use the LUBA record as the DR-II record?
Thoughts on that, Paul?
[They all talk at once.]
GREEN All of you.
DAVID Fine with me.
GREEN Okay. All right So then, so what I'm suggesting then is if we're going
to use the LUBA record as the DR-II-S record that it might be useful to
refer to any documents out of that record by the LUBA number, by the
page number. Does that make sense to be a little bit clearer? All right
So the record, I want to talk about the record will be the L UBA record
of LUBA 2012-42 and DR-Il-S. The remand record will be anything
that came in after that up until the close of the record. So what I would
like to do is have 7 days for general response to what's come in so far
and then a shorter period for rebuttaL Let me look at the calendar here
real quick. Okay. So if we look at the first round closing on the 11th, a
week from today, and then go to the 14th for rebuttal of evidence that
came in by the 11 th, and then the 21 st for final argument, and then
I would need to get a decision out.
DAVID What was the last one? 21st?
GREEN The 21 st for final argument, and obviously sooner would be better if, if
you can get it in sooner, then I would have more time to, to write the
decision. Paul?
PAUL I have to be in, in court. My schedule is being critical for that Thursday
and Tuesday in Eugene.
GREEN Which, which Thursday and which Tuesday?
PAUL Day after tomorrow and next Tuesday.
GREEN Okay.
PAUL Is there only way I can copy of that __
GREEN For the 12th? Sure. All right, so let's. What I want to do is to try to
keep Friday as that, as the end of the rebuttal period, so that just leaves
you with one day less for rebuttal on what came in on the first week
because I've got to give you 7 days by statute. That's, that's going to be
pretty tight, but I, I think that's the only way we can do it within the time
frame. Is that going to create too much of a headache for everybody?
PAUL No, works for me.
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A 13-8)
Page 32 of33
( . ~. :
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (A13-8)
February 4, 2014
GREEN All right. So February 12 will be the first round. February 14 will be
rebuttal, ifany. And then February 21 would be fmal argument by the
applicant and sooner is better.
DAVID These are aIlS o'clock?
GREEN S o'clock. Right.
DAVID
GREEN Just, just be sure that you get it in plenty of time in case the email
system crashes or something else crazy happens. Okay. And then that
would leave me about a week, that last week in February to get the
decision out. I'll do my best to, to get it out by the 28th. Barring that, it
would be the first week in March, and then we'll just have to try to cram
as much into the 30 days remaining to allow the Board to. Actually
Kevin, can the Board, could the Board go ahead and set a meeting on the
appeal before an appeal's filed? Have they done that before? Knowing
that an appeal is likely, they've just gone ahead and put it on the agenda,
or will they wait until there's an actual appeal?
KEVIN Well, they, typically, they wait until an actual appeal unless they want to
call it up.
GREEN Okay. Well. Think about that. So my goal would be to get a decision
out on the 28th or, if that's not possible, that first week in March as early
in that first week in March as possible. So, let's say I get it out on the
3rd, 12 days would take it out to the 15th, 14th let's say for appeal, so
that would give the Board only about 2 weeks, 2 1/2 weeks to, to review
it and decide if they want to hear it, which is tight but that's the best we
can do.
All right, so to review. First round of evidence closes at 5 p.m. on the
12th. Rebuttal 5 p.m. on the 14th. Final arguments on the 21 st by
5 [p.m.] or earlier. And Mr. Petersen, if you do submit them earlier,
please let me know or let Kevin know they're coming in earlier so Kevin
can let me know that record is closed and I can get started on the
decision. Okay. All right. So, any questions about process from now
on? Okay. We're adjourned. Thank you.
DAVID Thank you.
0371 I710000 1/5506695v I
Transcription of Hearing on Thornburgh Remand (AI 3-8)
Page 33 of33
TONKONToRPup
AlTOl\NEYS
1600 PIoneer Tower
888 SN FIflhAwnue
Portland. Oregon 97204
503.221.1440
David J. Petersen 503.802.2054
Admitted to practice in Oregon and California Fax: 503.972.3754
david.petersen@tonkon.com
May 19,2014
VIA E-MAIL (kevinh@co.deschutes.or.us)
Mr. Kevin Harrison
Deschutes County Community Development Department
] 17 NW Lafayette Avenue
Bend, OR 97701
Re: Loyal Land, LLC Declaratory Ruling Request
County File No. DR-11-8
Appeal to Board of Commissioners
Dear Mr. Harrison:
Enclosed are copies of the following documents to be placed into the record for this
matter:
1. Memorandum "Impact of the Great Recession on the Resort/Second-Home
Industry Nationwide and in Centra) Oregon" prepared by Peterson Economics dated May 12, 2014;
2. Affidavit of Kameron DeLashmutt dated May ]6,2014;
3. Affidavit of Terrence Larsen dated May 16,20]4; and
4. Letter from Peter Livin~ton to the Board of County Commissioners dated
May 13,2014.
An original of the letter from Mr. Livingston should already have been delivered to
your office. Originals of the other documents wi II be delivered to your office later this week by
Mr. DeLashmutt.
Thank you and please contact me if you have any questions or concerns.
David J. Petersen
DJP/djp
Enclosures
cc (bye-mail, w/o encl.): Mr. Kameron DeLashmutt
I, •
PETERSON ECONOMICS
MEMORANDUM
IMPACTS OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON THE RESORT / SECOND
HOME INDUSTRY NATIONWIDE AND IN CENTRAL OREGON
PREPARED FOR LOYAL LAND, LLC
May 12,2014
Project Number 427
Ii!06 ivlf.'.RINE DRIVE
ANACORTES, VVA 9822 I
TEL 360 588.9f30 I
FAX 360588 9870
I
MEMORANDUM
IMPACTS OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON THE RESORT / SECOND
HOME INDUSTRY NATIONWIDE AND IN CENTRAL OREGON
Peterson Economics was retained by Loyal Land, LLC in April 2014 to prepare this
memorandum discussing impacts ofthe Great Recession and Financial Crisis on the resort I
second-home industry nationwide and in Central Oregon in particular, with a focus on impacts
on the proposed Thornburgh Resort. This memorandum was prepared by Jon Peterson, President
of Peterson Economics.
MEMO OUTLINE
This memorandum includes the following components:
1. A summary of Peterson Economics' relevant qualifications;
2. A summary of second-home I resort market trends nationwide over the past decade;
and
3. A summary of market trends in Central Oregon and implications for the proposed
Thornburgh Resort project.
PETERSON ECONOMICS' QUALIFICATIONS
Given our experience in the industry, specific experience in Central Oregon, and
numerous assignments examining the proposed Thornburgh Resort between 2004 and 2008,
Peterson Economics is uniquely qualified to comment on development potential and
development parcel values at Thornburgh before, during, and after the Great Recession and real
estate market crash.
Peterson Economics was established in 2002 by Jon Peterson, a former principal at
Economics Research Associates. Since that time, Peterson Economics has been retained to
complete more than 420 market and financial analyses for proposed new communities, resorts,
and golf courses, making the firm an industry leader across North America. These assignments
have included over 100 relevant consulting assignments in the Pacific Northwest (most likely
more than all of our competitors combined).
Consulting assignments completed in Central Oregon have included:
• Brasada Ranch: we completed the original market and financial analysis for Jeld
Wen in 2002, as well as a series of follow-up studies that helped guide overall market
positioning.
• Caldera Springs: we completed the original market and financial analysis for Lowe
Enterprises in 2004, as well as several follow-up studies.
• Pronghorn: we completed a targeted market analysis for Pronghorn in 2004.
PETERSON ECONOMICS
(" .
• Black Butte Ranch: we were retained by the Black Butte Ranch POA in 2007 to
complete an evaluation of market and financial potential for a proposed annexation
into the community (adding about 350 residential units),
• Thornburgh: we completed a series of market and financial analyses for the
proposed new Thornburgh resort between 2004 and 2008, as well as an economic
benefit study.
• Remington Ranch: in 2010 and 2011, serving as an expert witness, we completed a
detailed analysis of historic and future potential for Remington Ranch, a failed,
partially developed community near Redmond, which lost funding in 2007 due to the
emerging financial crisis.
• Pine Forest / Caldera Springs: in late 2013, we completed a market and financial
analysis evaluating potential for a new resort community adjacent to Caldera Springs.
• Other Proposed Resort/Second-Home Communities: between 2004 and 2013, we
completed market and financial analyses for about ten other proposed new resorts or
second-home communities in Central Oregon.
• Primary Home Communities: in 2011 and 2012, we also completed targeted
market and financial analyses for a client who purchased several existing, partially
developed, primary home communities in the region, including McCall Landing in
Bend and Ochoco Pointe in Prineville.
Among other assignments, other notable experience in the Northwest includes:
• Suncadia: we completed a series of comprehensive market and financial analyses for
Suncadia, culminating in an exceptionally detailed market and financial analysis that
largely served as the initial business plan for the new resort community. In total, we
have completed in excess of20 major assignments for Suncadia / Tumble Creek.
• Other Upper Kittitas County Projects: we have completed over one dozen other
assignments for major land owners completing new resorts or second-home
communities in the region around Suncadia (Sapphire Skies, Plum Creek Timber,
etc.).
• Lake Chelan I Methow Valley! we have completed over one dozen market and
financial analyses for proposed new resorts, hotels, and second-home communities in
the region stretching from Wenatchee to the Methow Valley, including about 12
projects overlooking Lake Chelan.
• Columbia Gorge: we have completed market and financial analyses for three
proposed resort communities in the Gorge.
• Northern Idaho / Montana: we have completed market and financial analyses for
over 20 proposed new resorts and second-home communities, including several
proposed large-scale golf resort communities.
• Other Assignments! we have completed dozens of other relevant assignments in the
Northwest, including numerous assignments in the San Juan Islands (with ongoing
work for Rosario resort), several assignments on Vancouver Island, and a variety of
assignments on the Washington and Oregon coasts.
PETERSON ECONOMICS 2
Over the past four years, Peterson Economics has also served as an expert witness on
three major resort/second-home community projects in the Pacific Northwest (Remington Ranch,
Semiahmoo, and a proposed resort in the Columbia Gorge) focused on retro-active valuations of
resort development parcels, evaluating development parcel values before, during, and after the
market crash. We have also served as an expert witness on similar retroactive resort-parcel
valuation assignments in Michigan, New Jersey, Mississippi, California, and Mexico.
INTRODUCTION
The boom-and-bust cycle seen in the resort and second-home market over the last decade
in large part followed a similar cycle in the overall residential housing market, though it was
even more pronounced. The residential market experienced dramatic gains in the early 2000s,
fueled in large part by an ever increasing capital base directed towards residential lending. The
Subprime Mortgage industry, using sophisticated financial products, securitized mortgage
obligations attracted more and more capital into the US residential housing market allowing
promoters to package and sell vast amounts of US mortgages. To attract new customers, lenders
routinely relaxed credit standards. This financial bubble fed from and off of the housing bubble.
Although neither was sustainable, so long as home prices were rising the long term risks
were masked. Once the residential market peaked in 2005, and then softened in 2006 it exposed
some of the underlying risk ofthe Subprime industry. With that credit began to tighten. As
subprime defaults rose real questions were raised as to the value ofthe mortgage paper. By late
2006 the market for collateralized mortgage obligations was very limited. In July 2007 when
two large "Mortgage" funds managed by Bear Steams collapsed it created shock waves
throughout the financial community.
Trillions ofdollars of similar "Mortgage" securities sat on the books of banks and
institutions around the world with questionable value and no liquidity. This lack of liquidity
created the financial crisis which in turn led to the recession. As the residential housing market
had boomed on the back of easy credit, it collapsed under the weight of no credit. Prices
dropped. Defaults and foreclosures rose and values were further depressed. Similarly as the
resort and second-home market had rose on the heels of the residential market it also dropped,
often in much more severe fashion. This had dramatic and widespread impacts, including to the
resort and second-home industry nationwide and in Central Oregon in particular, as discussed in
more detail below.
NATIONAL TRENDS IN RESORT / SECOND-HOME MARKETS
Over the past decade, virtually all major U.S.-driven resort / second-home markets
experienced the following distinct trends:
• Market Boom: in 2004, 2005, and 2006, market conditions soared in virtually all
attractive resort destinations, with soaring prices and soaring sales volumes. This led
to a surge in new and proposed new development, and a dramatic surge in underlying
development parcel values.
PETERSON ECONOMICS 3
• Market Softening: by early 2007, as credit began to tighten, market conditions
began softening somewhat in most resort destinations. In general, second-home
prices (for lots, homes, cabins, and condos) remained fIrm, but sales volumes began
declining quickly. In 2007 it also became extremely difficult for new development
projects to obtain fInancing, even if fully entitled and situated on premier sites in top
tier resort markets, and even if recording strong pre-sales. For example, in early
2007, a long-term client pre-sold 30 of 69 proposed ultra-high-end condos on a
waterfront site on Maui, collecting non-refundable deposits averaging about $1
million each, but nevertheless failed to obtain fmancing to develop these condos, even
after approaching more than 100 prospective lenders. In this type of environment,
lack of entitlements and ongoing appeals became a major impediment for new
projects seeking to attract fInancing.
• Market Freeze: with the onset ofthe Great Recession and the Financial Crisis
recreation-property demand in most U.S.-driven resort markets largely evaporated by
late 2008. The long-term impacts of this pullback varied greatly based in large part
on the profIle of owners when the market froze. In fairly stable, established markets
(or resort communities) that saw minimal new development in the mid-2000s, the
primary impact ofthe downturn was a rapid decrease in sales volumes, coupled with
a modest decrease in sales prices (or values). However, the impact of the market
freeze was very different in emerging/fast-growing second-home markets -like
Central Oregon --that experienced massive development and sales in the mid-2000s.
Dozens of second-home destinations around the western United States boomed in the
early and mid-2000s, adding multiple new large-scale second-home/resort
communities. Many of these came to market in 2004 and 2005, enjoying exceptional
success by attracting large numbers of speCUlative buyers, hoping for even more price
appreciation. Many new resort-style communities in these markets sold hundreds of
lots during the market peak, with many purchased by speculators or others who
simply could not hang on to properties in the long run. The majority of these buyers
fInanced their purchases, often buying homesites with only fIve or ten percent down
payments. Many also relied on low-interest fIve-year "baJIoon" mortgages.
• Market Crash: when the market froze in late 2008, at fIrst, perceived values drifted
only moderately lower. However, within a year, a combination of factors (including
reduced net worth, reduced income, other liabiHties, and falling property values in
both source markets and second-home markets) resulted in the "perfect storm" to
create a self-perpetuating market crash, especially given the timing of fIve-year
"balloon" mortgages on properties sold in 2004 and 2005. As more and more
speculative properties reverted to bank ownership, banks dumped more and more
inventory on the market, often reducing prices once every two weeks in an effort to
unload inventory at any cost. Just as the belief in future inflation begets future
inflation, the belief in falling prices spooked remaining buyers to remain on the
sidelines, and falling prices persuaded more and more existing owners to simply take
a credit "hit" and let their properties revert to bank ownership. By 2010, many lot
owners who purchased homesites for $300,000 to $600,000 (or more) in the mid
2000s, but paid only fIve or ten percent down, could not justifY continuing to pay
PETERSON ECONOMICS 4
interest on huge loans. In the hardest hit major new second-home communities,
average homesite values quickly fen by 70 to 95 percent. For example, lots that
previously sold for $500,000 began selling for only $50,000 to $1 00,000 (or even less
in communities with structural issues leading to uncertain futures).
• Market Stabilization: by 2011, market conditions began stabilizing in many areas,
as improving economic conditions and market confidence encouraged new investors
to scoop up discounted, distressed properties. In many areas, distressed sales
comprised the vast majority of sales in 2010 and 2011, but represented only a small
minority by 2013.
• Market Recovery: with conditions in source markets (Le., major metro areas)
improving dramatically in 2013 and early 2014, many emerging second-home
destinations and many relevant second-home communities are now enjoying
significant appreciation, as inventories fall, home building starts back up, and long
term use-oriented buyers return to the market. However, in most cases around the
western United States, underlying homesite values remain well below "replacement
cost." For example, in many cases, premier golf-front, mountain-view, or lake-view
homesites in top-notch communities (typically with $30 million to $75 million
amenity packages, in established second-home destinations) that once sold for
$500,000 or more are still available for only $75,000 to $175,000. Many of these
communities also remain "flooded" with large inventories of standard interior
homesites, often valued at only $10,000 to $50,000 -far below prices necessary to
justifY this type of development from scratch.
Home and cabin values also feB sharply in many ofthese new, large-scale resort-style
communities. In most cases, home, cabin, or condo values fell by 30 to 60 percent -much less
than underlying lot values fell, but still enough to bring finished unit values down weB below
replacement cost. For example, in many cases, homes that were once valued around $1 million
now sell for around $500,000. Such a home might now occupy a lot worth $100,000, but this
house could cost about $700,000 to build from scratch. Until such units are cleared from
inventories, lot demand will remain somewhat muted and new communities will find it difficult
to market new units at prices high enough to justifY development costs.
The severe market downturn impacting individual property values and absorption within
new large-scale master-planned resort-style communities in these emerging second-home
destinations also had a very substantial negative impact on development parcel values, as well as
the values of partially developed new communities. For example, in the aftermath of the market
crash, it became common for attractive new partially developed communities -with substantial
unsold inventory to sell for a small fraction of prior values -often five to 15 percent of pre
crash values or "replacement cost." Thus, large new, partially developed communities (often
500 to 2,000 acres) featuring $30 million to $60 million in new amenities (golf courses,
clubhouses, recreation centers, etc.) and often $30 million to $70 million in new infrastructure
have been selling for as little as $2 million to $10 million, even when they have several hundred
homesites or other residential units remaining to develop and sell. In most cases, infrastructure
has already been developed to serve some of these remaining, unsold developer-owned
PETERSON ECONOMICS 5
homesites or units, with remaining areas simply requiring extension ofexisting infrastructure (at
lower cost than new development). With such exceptional values available, demand for
undeveloped resort community parcels has remained quite weak over the past five years.
TRENDS IN THE CENTRAL OREGON RESORT / SECOND-HOME MARKET
Over the past five decades, Central Oregon has grown to become one ofthe largest and
most popular resort I second-home destinations in the western United States. During this time,
development activity and market conditions have been through a series of booms and busts, but
none were more pronounced than the boomlbust cycle of the past decade. In fact, Central
Oregon witnessed one of the fiercest boom/bust cycles of any U.S.-driven second-home market
in history over the past decade. Between 2000 and 2007, the region commonly topped national
charts for fastest growing population, fastest appreciation, and most spectacular second-home
sales; however, between 2008 and 20 I 0, it also topped many charts for fastest depreciation,
fastest decline in sales, and fastest surge in regional unemployment rates.
Between 2000 and 2011, the following major resorts were developed in Central Oregon:
1. The Ranch at the Canyons (started development in 2001);
2. Pronghorn (started development in 2002);
3. Brasada Ranch (started development in early 2005);
4. Caldera Springs (started development in late 2005); and
5. Tetherow (started development in late 2006).
Remington Ranch, a massive proposed new resort community, also started development in late
2006; however, it ceased development within one year when it lost its primary funding source
due to the emerging financial crisis --and has been entangled in legal battles since.
During the exceptional market environment of2005 and 2006, Pronghorn, Brasada
Ranch, and Caldera Springs all achieved record-breaking pricing and absorption, opening the
door to strong developer profits if demand could be sustained. However, illustrating the severity
ofthis market collapse, by 2010, only Caldera Springs remained profitable (i.e., cash flow
positive, with sales revenues to date exceeding development costs to date).
For the proposed Thornburgh Resort, the most relevant" existing resort communities in
Central Oregon include Pronghorn, Brasada Ranch, and Caldera Springs. These communities all
came to market in the early to mid-2000s, featuring extensive amenity packages including golf,
and offering a variety of high-end real estate products appealing to recreation-oriented buyers.
Tetherow, the Ranch at the Canyons, Sunriver/Crosswater, Black Butte Ranch, Eagle Crest,
Aspen Lakes, and Cascade Meadow Ranch are also notable secondary comparables. However,
these are somewhat less relevant due to age (all but Tetherow are older), market positioning, or
location (Tetherow's location in Bend allows it to appeal to a different segment ofthe market).
Tables 1 through 7 provide a comprehensive summary ofthese top relevant resort-style
communities. This includes a summary oftheir sites, locations, amenities, real estate products,
pricing, and absorption, including comparisons of peak market conditions to market conditions
by late 2011.
PETERSON ECONOMICS 6
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Table I
CHARACTERISTICS OF RELEVANT EXISTING RESORT COMMUNITIES IN CENTRAL OREGON
Proximi!l: to Hi"h-End Services Total
Total Date Est. Annual
Developer 1 Size Resort Closest Upscale Drive General Inches
Resort Namil Location ~ (acres) Opened Service Center Time Settin" Precipitation
Pronghorn NE of Bend Hix Rubinstein 640 2002 I Bend 27 minutes flat, open, junipers, 7
mountain views
Brasada Ranch NE of Bend Jeld-Wen, 1,800 2005 I Bend 28 minutes sloping, open, junipers, 7
now Northview panoramic mountain views
Caldera Springs Sunriver Lowe Enterprises 400 2005 Sunriver 2 minutes meadow, forest, 18
Bend 30 minutes man-made lake
Tetherow Bend three separate 709 2006 Bend 5 minutes rolling, few trees, open, 12
ownership interests good mountain views
The Ranch at the Canyons NE of Redmond GardnerlHumphries 1,700 2001 Bend 45 minutes dry, open, next to 7
(Pac Trust) Smith Rocks (dramatic)
Sunriver Resort! Sunriver Lowe Enterprises 3,970 19671 Sunriver Mall onsi,te pine forest, meadows, 18
Crosswater Sunriver 1994 Bend 30 minutes rivers, mountain views
Black Butte Ranch Sisters Brooks Scanlon, 1,830 early '70s Sisters 5 minutes mountains, 25
nowHOA meadows, trees
Eagle Crest WofRedmond Jeld-Wen, 1,240 1985 Bend 20 minutes high desert, 8
now Northview rural
Aspen Lakes Sisters Cyrus Family 800 Late 1990s Sisters 5 minutes forest 25
Cascade Meadow Ranch Sisters Not Available 360 Late 1980s Sisters 5 minutes forest, meadow 25
Group Average: 1.345 15.2
Refers to year construction started.
Source: onsite resort managers and sales persons; and Peterson Economics.
Table 2
COMPONENTS OF RELEVANT EXISTING COMMUNITIES IN CENTRAL OREGON
Est. Cost of Overnight RetuiV Totul Planned
Resort Name Golf CIl!bhousel Other Amenities Amenities Lod!:;in!:; ComJ!leted Dinin!:; Commercial Residential
Pronghorn two 18-hole 38,000 sq.ft. rec. center, trails $65 million 24 townhomes fine dining in small retail space 289 lots,
courses with 48 keys clubhouse, plus casual in rec. center 79 homellot units,
in rec. center 90+ built units
Brasada Ranch 18-hole course 13,500 sq.ft. large rec. center. trails, $45 million 80 cabins wI 180 keys, dining in Ranch House pro shop up to 750 lots,
equestrian center plus four rooms and golf clubhouse; ISO built units
rooms in Ranch House juice bar in rec. center
Caldera Springs 9-hole golf park 6,500 sq.ft. rec. center, pools, $22 million 17 deed-restricted Zeppa Bistro general store I 320 lots,
(plus Crosswater lake, trails, playground cabins cafe 45 cabins
and Sunriver courses) with 68 keys
Tetberow 18-hole course 17,600 sq.ft. none $15 million none dining in clubhouse none 3791015,
510 built units
The Ranch at tbe Canyons none 8,000 sq.fl. event "barn," tennis, $5 million2 none limited dining none 60 lots
vineyard,
canyons, equestrian
Sunriver Resort two 18-hole courses I in Lodge; spa, pools, river, n.a. 240 guestrooms fine dining, 105k sq.fl. 3,396 lots,
plus Crosswater I stand-alone trails, air strip plus 1,400 rentals casual dining 850 condos
Crosswater 18-hole semi-private 15,000 sq. ft. small pool, tennis, rivers, n.a no lodging, but dining in clubhouse none 94 lots,
course trails Osprey PI. rentals 23 Osprey PI.
Black Butte Rancb two 18-hole two clubhouses; new $7M rec. center; n.a. 76 condos, fine dining, 2,000 sq. ft. 1,177 lots,
courses one renovated tennis, fitness, 224 homes casual dining 76 condos
trails, equestrian
Eagle Crest two 18-hole courses two clubhouses 2 rec centers; n.a. 100 gueslrooms casual dining small shop 1,737 lots,
plus short course tennis, fitness, plus 75 condos in lodge cabins, and condos
trails, equestrian
Aspen Lakes 18-hole course 17,000 sq.ft. small community center n.a none snack bar pro shop liS lots
Cascade Meadow Rancb none small clubhouse horse barn and paddocks, n.a none none none 24 lots
indoor and outdoor riding arenas,
trout lake, tennis courts, storage
I Conditioned space only.
~ Estimated by Peterson Economics.
Source: onsite resort managers and sales persons; and Peterson Economics.
Table 3
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPER-OWNED CUSTOM HOMESITE SALES AT TOP RELEVANT EXISTING COMMUNITIES
Property Name
Planned
Number of
Lots
Average
SalesNr in
Market Frenzy
(2005 to 2007)
Total Sales
in Market
Freeze
(2008)
Total Sales
in Market
Slide
(2009)
Total Sales
in Market
Collapse
(2010)
Total Sales
in Market
Trough
(2011*)
Developer
Homesite
Sales to
Datel
RemainingAverage
• 1 Developer
AbsorptIOn I tnven ory
Pronghorn
Brasada Ranch
Caldera Springs
Tetherow
The Ranch at the Canyons
289
750
320
379
60
37.7
105.3
101.6
29.0
5.0
0
0
2
28
0
I
0
2
0
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
14
5
0
266
319
273
65
22
28.0 23
45.6 431
42.0 47
14.4 314
2.4 38
Total 1,798 279 30 3 5 19 945 26 853
Average Developer Homesites Sold Per Year (life of project): 26.5 (homesites/yr)
Average Developer Homesites Sold Per Year in Market Frenzy: 55.7 (homesites/yr)
Average Developer Homesites Sold Per Year at New Resorts Since 2008: 2.9 (homesiteslyr)
• From January through late December.
I Where applicable, includes sales prior to 2005.
2 Developer homesites only. Calculated since start of sales (mid-2002 for Pronghorn; early 2005 for Brasada; mid-2005 for Caldera; mid-2007 for Tetherow).
Source: Peterson Economics, AmeriTitle, MLS, and individual communities.
Table 4
SUMMARY OF TOTAL CUSTOM HOMESITE SALES AT TOP RELEVANT EXISTING COMMUNITIES
(INCLUDING DEVELOPER SALES AND RESALES)
Property Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011*
Pronghorn
Annual Sales 66 27 20 13 12 4 5
Average (Mean) Price $630,000 $622,000 $638,000 ~527,OOO $132,000 $272,000 $86,800
Total Volume $41,580,000 $16,794,000 $12,760,000 $6,851,000 $1,584,000 $1,088,000 $434,000
Brasada Ranch"
Annual Sales 201 102 23 13 15 38 32
Average (Mean) Price S325,OOO $325,000 $348,000 $335,000 $174,000 $77.600 $64,600
Total Volume $65,325,000 $33,150,000 $8,004,000 $4,355,000 $2,610,000 $2,948,800 $2,067,200
Caldera Springs
Annual Sales 203 37 28 14 3 26 26
Average (Mean) Price $339,900 $360,300 $366,000 $351,000 $199,000 $145,600 $127,300
Total Volume $68,999,700 $13,331,100 $10,248,000 $4,914,000 $597,000 $3,785,600 $3,309,800
Tetberow
Annual Sales N.A. N.A. 29 28 3 0 7
Average (Mean) Price N.A. N.A. $584,700 $551,900 $483,000 N.A. $214,000
Total Volume N.A. N.A. $16,956,300 $15,453,200 $1,449,000 0 $1,498,000
The Canyons
Annual Sales 8 4 3 0 0 0 1
Average (Mean) Price SI 176,000 SI,031,300 $1,300,000 N.A. N.A. N.A. $2B5,000
Total Volume $9,408,000 $4,125,200 $3,900,000 $0 $0 $0 $285,000
Total Sales 478 170 103 68 33 68 71
Average Price (Mean) $387,683 $396,472 $503,576 $464,312 $189,091 $115,035 $106,958
Total Volume $185,312,700 $67,400,300 $51,868,300 $31,573,200 $6,240,000 $7,822,400 $7,594,000
• Recorded from January through late December .
.. Sales exclude two homesites sold at auction in 2011.
Source: Peterson Economics, AmeriTitle, MLS, and individual communities.
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Table 5
PEAK DEVELOPER PRICING VERSUS CURRENT RESALE PRICING OF HOMESITES AT
TOP RELEVANT EXISTING COMMUNITIES1
Property Name
Interior Homesites Golf-Front I Premier Homesites
Peak Developer
Pricing
Current Resale
Pricing % Change Peak Developer Current Resale
Pricing Pricing % Change
Pronghorn1
Pronghorn wI mandatory
golf membership
Brasada Ranch
Caldera Springs
Tetherow
The Ranch at the Canyons
$450K to $550K
$550K to $650K
$200K to $325K
$295K to $350K
N.A.
N.A.
$6K to $85K
$121K to $200K
$25K to $60K
$90K to $130K
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
-69% to -78%
-82% to -88%
-63% to -69%
N.A.
N.A.
$600K to $900k $14K to $100K
$700K to $l.OM $129K to $215K
$370K to $530K $55K to $120K
$390K to $480K $130K to $140K
$320K to $775K $l55K to $199K
$495K to $1.35M $285K
N.A.
-79% to -82%
-77% to -85%
-66%to-71%
-51% to 75%
-69%
I Peak pricing generally occurring from 2006 through early 2008. Current pricing as of late 2011. Focuses on active segment of market (some higher).
2 Estimates subtract value of mandatory golf membership (all owners are compelled to put·chase). Resale prices focus on range with active sales.
Price drop w/out membership misleading, as $115k membership still required.
Source: Peterson Economics, AmeriTitle, MLS, and individual communities.
Table 6
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPER BUILT PRODUCT SALES AT TOP RELEVANT EXISTING COMMUNITIES
M, ~
Property Name Planned
Units
Average
SalesfYr in
Market Frenzy
(2005 to 2007)
Sales in
Market
Freeze
(2008)
Sales in
Market
Slide
(2009)
Sales in
Market
Collapse
(2010)
Sales in
Market
Trough
(2011 *)
Total
Sales l
Average
Absorption2
Remaining
Inventory
PronghornJ
Brasada Ranch
Caldera Springs
Tetherow4
90+
150
45
510
10
26
4
0
11.2
0
5
0
I
0
4
0
0
2
4
0
1
0
0
0
35.8
80
17
0
5
11
3
N.A.
66+
70
28
510
Total 795 40 16 5 6 1 133 7 674
*From January through late December.
I Includes sales prior to 2005 when applicable.
2 Developer units only. Calculated since start of sales (2005 for Pronghorn; 2005 for Brasada; and 2007 for Caldera).
3 Includes whole-ownership and fractional unit sales (expressed as whole-unit equivalents).
4 No built product released as of December 2011. Plans have included 210 townhome units and a condo-lodge with up to 300 for-sale units.
Source: Peterson Economics, AmeriTitle, MLS, and individual communities.
Table 7
PEAK DEVELOPER PRICING VERSUS CURRENT RESALE PRICING OF BUILT PRODUCT
AT TOP RELEVANT EXISTING COMMUNITIES l
Property Name Peak Developer
Pricing
Current Resale
PriCing % Change
Pronghorn2 $540/sq.ft. $150/sq .ft. ·72%
Brasada Ranch $435 to $475Isq.ft. $180 to $224/sq.ft. -53% to ·59%
Caldera Springs $440 to $500/sq.ft. $300 to $320/sq.ft. ·32% to -36%
Tetherow3 N.A. N.A. N.A.
I Peak pricing generally occurring from 2006 through early 2008. Current pricing as of late 2011.
Expressed as price per square foot.
2 Prices for whole·ownership built units.
3 No built product released as of December 2011.
Source: Peterson Economics, AmeriTitle, MLS, and individual communities.
' ..'
As depicted, Central Oregon's 11 relevant resort-style communities:
• Range in size from about 360 to 4,000 acres (averaging about 1,350 acres);
• Typically include extensive amenities, including golf courses, clubhouses, recreation
centers, pools, trails, and other amenities; and
• Typically include 400 to nearly 1,800 residential units (though one includes only 24
homesites and one includes more than 4,200 total units).
All are within five to 45 minutes ofeither Bend or Sisters, and most are within 30 minutes of
these upscale service hubs. Newer resorts such as Pronghorn, Brasada Ranch, and Tetherow
occupy open sites, typically dotted with junipers rather than prime forested sites like Sunriver or
Black Butte Ranch. While Tetherow is located on the outskirts of Bend, Pronghorn and Brasada
Ranch are both about 30 minutes away from Bend.
Due to a wide variety of factors -ranging from strong macroeconomic conditions, to
excitement surrounding new resort development, to the real estate bubble itself-Central Oregon
enjoyed a remarkable real estate boom in the mid-2000s. Between 2000 and 2005, many of
Central Oregon's resorts saw typical homesite prices double, transactions increase, and sales
volumes soar. New resort communities like Pronghorn, Brasada Ranch, and Caldera Springs
were the prime beneficiaries ofthis boom. By 2005, Central Oregon had clearly entered into a
"market frenzy," where buyers were literally lining up to buy homesites priced as high as
$500,000 at resorts like Brasada Ranch, often in hopes of further appreciation.
As shown on Table 3, the region's five newest resort-style communities -Pronghorn,
Brasada Ranch, Caldera Springs, Tetherow, and The Ranch at the Canyons -sold an average of
about 55.7 developer homesites per year from 2005 to 2007. Brasada Ranch and Caldera
Springs both initiated sales in 2005 and sold more than 200 developer-owned lots and units
(each) in their first year of sales -apparently setting new records for the State of Oregon. If
these resorts had continued to enjoy even modest success selling developer homesites and units
at such prices, they could have potentially generated strong developer profits in the late 2000s,
despite high initial development costs.
However, absorption rates began to cool in 2006 before declining precipitously in 2007,
with price appreciation outpacing the amount most prospective buyers were willing to pay. In
2007, sales of developer-owned homesites and units within Pronghorn, Brasada Ranch, and
Caldera Springs dropped to rates ofonly about ten properties per year a decrease of more than
95 percent at Brasada Ranch and Caldera Springs from initial levels. As shown on Table 4, the
average (mean) price of a homesite sold within Central Oregon's five newest resort communities
had climbed higher than $500,000 by 2007 (pulled up by high prices at Pronghorn and Tetherow
and a few $1 million-plus sales at The Ranch at the Canyons). As shown on Table 5, peak
pricing for interior homesites ranged from $200,000 to $650,000, and peak pricing for golf-front
I premium homesites ranged from $320,000 to $1.35 million.
By 2008, the resort real estate market in Central Oregon had degenerated from a frenzy
into a freeze, with transactions plummeting. Price declines finally followed suit. Annual
homesite sales volumes (including developer properties and resales) at Pronghorn, Brasada
PETERSON ECONOMICS 7
Ranch, Caldera Springs, Tetherow, and The Ranch at the Canyons dropped another 39 percent
from 2007 to 2008. Then, as the market entered into a deep slide, homesite sales volumes
dropped another 80 percent from 2008 to 2009. Moreover, this was accompanied by a
catastrophic drop in average (mean) homesite sales prices, from about $464,300 in 2008 to only
$189,100 in 2009. This brought average homesite sales prices well below the mark needed for
most new resorts to simply break-even on resort development costs, curtailing developers' desire
and ability to continue chasing prices downward with additional price reductions.
While 2009 can be characterized as a steep market slide, 2010 represented a market
collapse. Driven downward by the large number of bank-owned distressed homesites hitting the
market, average (mean) homesite sales prices within the region's five new resort communities in
2010 fell to only about $109,700, compared to $464,300 in 2008. This represented a price
decrease of about 76 percent in only two years. However, these low prices finally caught the
attention of bargain hunters. In 2010, sales volumes were up about 30 percent from 2009.
However, most ofthese sales were occurring at "pennies on the dollar" relative to original sales
prices.
During this market slide and subsequent market collapse, developers at Pronghorn,
Brasada Ranch, Caldera Springs, Tetherow, and The Ranch at the Canyons were typically
unwilling to compete with bank-owned properties. This resulted in a situation where most bank
owned homesites and units were priced at less than half the price oftypical developer listings
and perhaps 75 percent the price of non-distressed resales. For example, at Brasada Ranch, it
became common for developer homesites priced at $200,000 or $300,000 to sit adjacent to
identical bank-owned homesites asking $50,000 or $100,000. As a result of the influence of
low-priced resale properties (typically either short sales or foreclosures), developer sales came to
a near standstill by mid-2008. In fact, from 2008 to 2011, the developer sales pace at Central
Oregon's five newest resort communities averaged a dismal three homesites per resort per year
despite remaining developer inventory ofmore than 850 homesites.
To a large extent, the market collapse of2010 represented a "nasty echo" of the sales
success enjoyed at major sales launches in 2005, when a high percentage of buyers opted for low
down payment five-year balloon mortgages. As these came due in 2010 without good options
to sell, negotiate terms, or refinance -many homesites reverted to lenders, who subsequently
priced them as low as 10 to 20 cents on the dollar (relative to initial pricing) in order to unload
them quickly. Making matters worse, during this transition, most lenders refused to pay club
dues and homeowners' association fees, thus exacerbating club operating shortfalls.
Prices within Central Oregon's new resorts slid another seven percent on average in
2011, with average homesite sales prices dropping to about $127,000 at Caldera Springs,
$86,800 at Pronghorn, $65,000 at Brasada Ranch, and $285,000 at The Ranch at the Canyons.
Interior homesite prices within the region's five newest resorts ranged from a mere $25,000 to
$200,000, while golf-front / premium homesite prices ranged from $55,000 to $285,000.
However, prime west-side resorts (including Black Butte Ranch, Aspen Lakes, and Sunriver)
continued to support much higher values on average, and numerous indicators suggest that the
market may have hit bottom, with a significant recovery likely within the next several years.
PETERSON ECONOMICS 8
!
Sales volumes held fairly steady in 2011, with fewer distressed listings available to spur demand.
Fortunately, however, inventories also declined notably in most Central Oregon resorts in 2011.
With demand from Central Oregon's major source markets (portland, Seattle, and San
Francisco metro areas) recovering strongly and the supply of distressed inventory largely gone,
Central Oregon's resort communities enjoyed a very strong recovery over the past two years.
This recovery gained strength in 2013 and 2014 year-to-date. For example, average lot sales
prices at Brasada Ranch surged 56 percent between 2011 and 2013, and lot sales volumes surged
109 percent.
Thus, resort real estate values and overall market conditions in Central Oregon appear to
be well into a broad-based recovery. To some extent, price appreciation will almost certainly be
tempered by releases of existing unsold developer inventory and "shadow inventory" (lots or
homes individual owners wish to sell, but have held off the market waiting for conditions to
improve). These future releases could add about 500 to 750 lots and a much more limited
number ofbuilt units to the market over the next several years. However, in a stronger market,
given the size of the Central Oregon marketplace, this might represent a two-to four-year supply
of new inventory. Moreover, beyond this, other potential additions to supply will likely be
limited until prices have experienced a notable recovery.
CONCLUSIONS
Clearly, the resort I second-home industry was directly and very significantly impacted
by trends in the national economy and credit markets in particular. The industry experienced a
massive boom in the mid-2000s, followed by a freeze and severe collapse in the late 2000s. As a
result ofits location, stage, and number ofnew large-scale communities, Central Oregon
experienced one of the fiercest boom-and-bust cycles of any markets, with direct implications for
Thornburgh's development parcel value and the ability to obtain funding before, during, and
after the market crash.
Although local market conditions remained fairly strong in 2006 and early 2007, credit
began contracting with funding uncertain in 2006 and 2007 prior to the market crash. A local
example of these trends comes from Remington Ranch, a proposed new large-scale destination
resort near Redmond. Remington Ranch received full entitlements in late 2006 and began
construction in November 2006, funded through several sources (including bank financing,
developer assets, and a Founders program). Initial development efforts were proceeding
successfully until March 2007, when Bank ofthe Cascades informed Remington Ranch that it no
longer had the capability of funding the Phase 1 construction loan. However, Columbia River
Bank then authorized an $8 million increase in its existing credit line, enabling construction to
continue. Additional funds were also reportedly raised through a Charter program. However,
additional funds were needed to move forward, and Columbia River Bank was unable to provide
sufficient funding alone. As such, in late summer 2007, Remington Ranch, LLC ordered its
contractors to cease construction and has been seeking construction financing since that time.
Following this, Remington Ranch reportedly refunded all lot reservation-holders.
PETERSON ECONOMICS 9
Remington Ranch is just one example of how the financial crisis was impacting the
Central Oregon resort industry prior to the recession. Thornburgh was also experiencing
challenges in obtaining funding from early 2006 onward. In that environment, Thornburgh's
ongoing land use appeals and resultant delays further increased uncertainty, reducing lenders
willingness to provide project financing no matter how great the project is.
Following the onset ofthe Great Recession and the financial crisis, Central Oregon's
resort real estate market froze, and then eventually collapsed, as more and more properties
reverted to lenders, who dumped large inventories on the market and continuously reduced prices
until eventually finding a bottom. As shown in Table 4, average lot sales prices at the area's
most relevant resorts --which peaked in 2007 at $503,576 --had dropped to $106,958 by 2011.
Absorption of developer homesites in top relevant communities also fell from an average of
about 56 sales per year before the crash, to only three sales per year during the crash (2008
through 2011). As a result, financing sources were effectively eliminated. Furthermore,
tremendous uncertainty existed at the time over what type of products the market would be
interested in, and when that would be. Developers couldn't be certain that the products they had
planned in the heyday would be of interest following the collapse, or when. Even if a developer
was financially able to move forward with additional entitlements, planning and permitting
actions, in the middle of that environment, anything they did would likely be a waste oftime, and
money. By 2011 Thornburgh was on the edge of bankruptcy, fighting for survival. For it to
have redirected its efforts and pursued further permitting until market conditions warranted
would have been ridiculous.
Although Central Oregon's resort industry has seen much recovery since then, until sales
prices increase substantially capital sources are unlikely to invest, which will limit development
for at least the short term.
PETERSON ECONOMICS 10
···~~~t~TE.~~·Q~6N ..)
·.:¢o~:~»~~~.. ."J~.'.'
·;.~~~~~.~..~4~~~~~~
WQrwatlOlli~a,Uhave knoWledg~;6f;
L .IWf)S the C~fuUP~~fPf'Pwmb~;Re501;t'.~,.lJr,C me)developer of
the, Thornb~Re$ort Irptn;l®4llDtilLoyrutant\,tL¢iQt~Jti~on~e resort property
owned.\iyTt(C.in August 2QH.Inlate.7l000 lent~mt,03'¢Ontmct19huy larla6Whed by my
6ran,dpareu.ts, ~vere~ and Eva'Thotnb:Utgh. fUid began tl,te'initialplannmg pr~ I consulted
leg:;il counsel about the cost ana. time required fqr entitlements and was. a9vised to budget
$500;000 and schedule 18 months for the CMPIFMP.
2. ill Jllhe 2004, I fooned me with David Chapm:at).. ijD,d assigned the contract to the
company. From then until June: 2007, we were TRC'sco-managers. In June 2Q071became
mc's sole manager, and I am still TR:C'ssole managedoday. In my role as mahager ofTRe, I
am familiar with: a) all expenditures incurred by TRC in connection with the project, b)a1l
actions taken by me to obtain funding, c) all entitlement efforts. land use actions, and appeals,
and; d) how entitlement delays, the financial crisis and the Great Recession impacted TRe.
3. In August 2004, TRe retained Schwabe, Williamson and Wyatt as legal counsel,
plus numerous consultants needed for the eMP and FMP. Per earlier advice I expected it to cost
about $500,000 to achieve a final, approved FMP, but to be safe TRC budgeted $600,000. On
February 18,2005, TRC submitted its CMP application. It quickly became apparent that Ms.
Gould intended to object to nearly everything regarding the project, and as a result the
administrative record for the eMP became huge and time consuming. The record for the first
Affidavit of Kameron Delashmutt Page 1
t
t
CMP:appeaho LWAwas·.wen<>v~StOOO~.:)3ecauSeoftheslie ofth« reoordandsevetal
recoitlobjedi~~ffqDi'~"~i4i~t;k)n~Dearly a y~(~ertbanthe,21 days,.
. .
..:.;....1b. L··UBA'·' ......1 ....'\.·,.... .;:..1'"~...... ·~lA...·t \i.... " . .,..:-... to~'I':A the recota TR.C's'"'....;;;..,;..·~• ...4-a".·reqLl.l,\~ if .1UD;;h auuw~~~".1 i)~.W.~1 . ~y", ~y . .I"~-~"" ,
c'ounsel did Once the,~d'~:fi:na'Dy\iijOOled,Ll.TDAtoQlt ~~five monthS ra'thertban the
statutori1y~required77dq:SJo1SSUean,~<OV«ra.Ut theLUBA appeal of the eMf took
nearly one thll.year, ~'With.Ltil:l~:Ii~Qlmltgfl:\e County's decision with respect to all but 3
ofMs. Gould's 3t)~:rveral1;assignmentsol':mot",
4. LUBA'sCMP<keiaion ~fOllowedby antlbsuccessfU1lJPpeal to the Court of
Appeals(COA). Aftet1heJ;enlalldfinally'1l:1adeit back to the. County, Ms. Gould again app~led
to LUBA, ahd then again to the COA When sM diu.not prevail at either LUBA or the COA,
Ms. Gould asked the: COA toreeotlSlder. Aft,ef r~nsi4eqltion was denied, Ms. Gould appealed
to the Oregon Supreme Court, Which refused tollear her appeal. TRC finally received "final"
approval ofthe CMF on Decembet 9. 2009, five years after filing, at a cost of $2,269,095 most
ofwhich was spent defettdingfour years ofappeaIs. Except for increased cost and time, Ms.
Gould's appeals had little,.if any, discernible effe~t on the project.
S. Prior to being able to suQmit the FMP application lRC needed to complete
numerous items to meet conditions of approvaL To this end we pursued at substantial cost,
applied for and received the following permits and approvals, a) Water Pollution Control Facility
permit issued on February 14, 2007ata cost of$] 54,846.91, b) ODFW Water Rights Permit,
issued on March 22, 2007, that along with water rights cost $239,984, which included defending
and settling the protest and appeal of our permit, c) Annexation into the Redmond Fire
Department on May 10th, 2007, d) DRS Drinking Water Permit on May 21, 2007 at a cost of
$100,089, e) Right of Way with the BLM issued on July 16,2007, which was subsequently
Affidavit of Kameron DeLashmutt Page 2
I
-_..........'*-,--,-----==--~--.
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:-,~-.~....
{
W;~~l·~tJri.;at·;~'···'._f)DFWonApri14?10Ql~',
......•.'........ '...Q.pP)iMliqti.:fot::RMP't~~h:~ . . .
~~8)1~'bytJie'C()UIltyQn ~Q"r'~2;()8r~""" '.
•. ~~1l'F.h;";.i\1'!i·. A" .• n~ustimes,Wit1:l:a·tblal Qrder'bYiJ.,UB:A;' .:., '.',.' .'•'.it'
...~t¥~I[~\1gu8t:J·6~;"'A.~'·'0:.~lirik..ib-v.·1,...ee ···ems .1het'kitlal·· .... ,.o:,\1:if ... '. pUUY ... ~J.U.l. .. Y ". . ......-".,.
'~p~tion~>~" ··'·~'t:l1~,.aooI1eanoitanddefCri~git on~ppeal was$lA94;g~ :tht:.··'
. 'rem~a~';" ;:; ..~a~{·;':ltthe:FMPtemand.iS:ihltiated'ruid theFMP're-a~Yeil"Ms,'.,·
GOilla~!:i1~~~~~'~~itilUr:th~,;m~g itwill1ikely take 'another 18 mpJ;Jthst&2
yeatstoe()mpl~t&malFMP.TR~¢ostof~tmitfmgthe CMP and,FMP to tmteis $41310,152'. .'
nearly.$4,OO(),OQO b~ef:b1l4~'(.n.ot t;ountingthe costto finish theFMP or the tehtatl~pl~t)and
far inexcess6ftli~~aDlOllths'8llocatedtodoS()"In addition to those costs. TRC 'also spe;nt
$364~999 p~glts P~e A 1'~1ative Plat, Wbi~h comprises 27 pages ofengineered
draWings. the'~te;n$ive'penni~~,ebsts and delays had severe ramifications, which were like a
snowball: the :further TRe,p~edthe larger the issues became.
7. T:bro~~ut rulland use appliCations by TRC I pushed as hard.as I could to
complete them. Fol"e,xample, TRCfiled its fitst FMP on August II, 20'0'7, over two years befoxe
'fRCeventua}ly received final approval of the CMP in 20'0'9. The eMP was still on appeal at
this time and the County held the FMPapplication pending the outcome of the CMP appeals.
8. The reason 1 pushed ahead on the FMP, notwithstanding the risk that the eMP
approval would be overtumedtheteby rendering the FMP application moot, was to assist TRe's
financing efforts with Sterling Bank (discussed below). However, filing the application for the
FMP before the CMP appeals were complete created logistical issues with the County. On
January 30', 20'0'8, TRels counsel had a phone conversation with Ruth Wahl and Laurie Craghead
Affidavit ofKamer on Delashmutt Page 3
l
i
I
I
otflle.·a()lmty~~gthebest.tnatmetin,wbiehro,proceed as qUicldY M~l?Pssible. The, County
, ".. . ,."., ' .
~lt~'l1(;rhad jufu~:fhe;gun iiI filii1gtheFMP~whenitdid,.,tQ ~~,tbe.Coun~~
. ': ' . . ... ' . . .,:, ..',. .
con~.ilt.n ~edtc:JmrthetextcmSions.()fthelS0.Y:c.1oek(orade~biolt o~thefFUr ~4
th~~j~tlyi~.asChedUle offIow to. proceed.After,:theJit'St~dQ;f~e:GMP
from.LtmA On A.ifll1~2008J,the County asked that TRC,terminate,the.;o:ri~al.EMf 3P}7lication
andleSubnnt'it 'fie didsb With1:henew.s~bnrittal filed·on April~l~~OQJkl}.~ly 19'Dl9il~
t>rJ.9l'to. . the eventUal. final a.pprov,alofthe CMP in Decem.ber2()09~ .Tb.~;~ubnUttedFMP'.....-. ,"
appljCatiOrtWBS linlnedime1y qeemed complete and the b:~gscheduleiil. This.appro~b ·was
bighly unustihl and cattie4 significant risk that the eMF would n01beapptDYed;bad no
ptoi!eeded ina more :typical maimer it would have waited until after theGMr~;final to file the
FMl> application after December 9,2009. Thus; only by takingsignmqmttisk.$.to acceletatethe
process was TRC ableto obtain a remand ofthe FMP in August 2010. Raditinstead waited an
additional 19 months to file the FMP applicatiolt,. and otherwise Ms. Gould's appeals of ~e mP
proceeded on the same schedule, the FMP would not have been remanded until March2012 four
months after the CMP expired in~November 2011.
9. Beginning in 2006, TRC was looking for additional funding. Despite strong early
interest in the project including over 500 unit purchase reservations, TRGs financing efforts
were hampered by the delays and the conflict within the entitlement process. TRC had
discussions with dozens ofpotential lenders. The status of the entitlements was a constant issue.
Because ofthe constant appeals TRC wasn't able to conclude funding. As a result Mr. Chapman
and I were personally lending TRC substantial sums.
10. In late 2006 I began negotiations with Parker Group Investments, LLC (pOI) and
Mr. Jeff Parker regarding possible financing. Through early 2007 I was trying to finalize an
agreement with PGI. As that progressed, in April 2007 PGI lent TRC $1 million. Then in June
Affidavit of Kameron DeLashmutt Page 4
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,~emetrt's!:.~,~~,~~"~(,l!~~O;Ml1t~~tl~?·•..••.
,a,:j~~~~';
'·'0.,
..' wt>lilap~~_DMbrid~~lgAn~'~>.... .fa~,~~itoy,1i~d~v~~~fUnding,
. . .. '''~m'',;:,;I'Ji.<t'·l.........j~~;l:m··""~d"..a ...;~c.:J~b:..',mD"lo~~;..-:'~:+'k....:~~1..u....~,..~...· ... ~~.:...1 ..:tl,k~"...l;1
Cuow er."! ~_,lU,. "',l.'o~C!'" ,I.:UUuw~.. .l~\.(. ~.;...... ~~1~~....,~~~'.1'Y~:<;IIt........~...~ .v~
'006"% "'f'~~'" ·.··."\il;$l.ts' , ...•.·.·.··.·.... raiseifvaiwDrfi1ni.'·cal·k~~.·,t(''''.·.·'l~·.:i~iJ...: +a.·.t'·ihattime.·.·', VlOv u.,K;~J, .. apR.. . ...~, ·.lK.A . ~~1lf~"-~. ~,+;~~ .. ','
12. .OilAugusdlOt2007,]9'daY$~~tb,t~f_~1lcat,ion~,mM, 8~lin~
iSSlied a L;etter ofmtetest t.91'rovide a $15 million.1tlan.,t k:new tlmr,emtcnQI1m ~eliitfrom
$:20M to $i5M was gom'gtb ~ause'acash crisisllithehear,ten,1lfw'l'RG, an4 was hopeful that
once; the appraisalwas com.pleted the'value w()uld,~:$tteb,~t.S~ling would inereasethe loan
amount bliSeptember 19,2007 the appraisal was cOfU..'Pleted.(~t;taehedExfu'bit 1)showing a
valile of$5Q million. Even though it.badprovid~d ~~JllfUJ,~'for$20M, Sterling would not
increase the loan as requested. Sterling W8$ coneemed,about the deteriorating ~~qnomy and its
portfolio exposure to development lands. On OOtober'li) 2007 J S~issued a commitment
letter for the $15 million loan. which wasohly :30% of the appraised value (compared to 60%
Loan to Value ratios that were common earlier in 2007).
13. On November 8,2007 the Bend Bl1lletin ran an article with the headline
"Thornburgh Runs into Hurdle", and "Developers must show resort won'thave negative impact
on wildlife!' That caused Sterling great concern and it had a new appraisal prepared on
November 15,2007 establishing a value of $36,520,000 (a decrease of 29% in just one month).
As a result, Sterling reduced the loan amount 10510;956,000 (30% of the new value) which was
far short ofTRC's needs. This reduction eliminated all interest reserves and after paying items
due at closing TRC had little cash on hand with substantial operating expenses. Over the course
Affidavit of Kameron DeLashmutt Page 5
ofaoout7montllsfIOmA;pr;it'tn NGvembCJ':2,OO1·the loan.)~ge;ne fiol:n.af$20~11WillQ$l
aSsutane~ Whlt'll)in~:mOte:possitifb~'itt'oU1~~fiNmresima$lS"mill1oil co~eIlt,.tc>
an S11 xriillion Joaa '
14. Witltf&eetonomy tt~()mting rapidly and ll():OWet optjQ~ ngclosed the loan
.on NovemOOt t9~'2001/1, 'Atolo..g me::kda S9DUllioDi*et short:(aUlJittleoperating
. . . .
capital~nQ inte:rest'f~sU~al::~asi.t~i~L~e tnit¥le ofnumerous land
use actions. ThiS Jnclu~d processing tlie,(;kp,l:ematt~~.~QCOllIlt}'and defending jt in
several ap-pea.ls, 'aptlPulliii~and~~g'the,FMPapplioation,anddefendingjt ~)fl appeal.
From November 2001 ()nwatdt.ItCeomact~d hunorerulof parties 'regatdingatiditiQnal funding,
but with the countrY in: fiilancful :cnsis atidthe ecQl1omy:in lr¢efall, no 39ditional funding was
available.
15. PrIor tQ closing the Sterling loan , there were nQ conflicts between POI arid TRC,
but beginIiing in early 2008, the cash shortfall fon()wing~losing created substantial conflicts
between TRC and POI. In later 2008,tlitough 2009 and .on, POI had discussions soliciting
investQrs tQ finance PGrs purchase .of the Sterling lQan so POI CQuld foreclQse .on TRC. In early
2010 a PO] affiliate cQntracted tQ purChase the Sterling lQan. In October201 0 Sterling Bank
issued a nQtice .of intent to fQreclQse .on the Thornburgh property .on March 3, 2011.
16. Parker was still trying tQ line up the capital to finance his purchase QfthenQte,
and around February 15.,2011, lleamed he had asked Mr. Terry Larsen tQ finance his acquisitiQn
.of the lQan frQm Sterling. In late February 2011, I spoke tQ Mr. Larsen a cQuple .of times, but
nQthing came .of thQse discussions. At the same time, in the event the fQreclQsure sale was going
fQrward I'd been preparing fQr TRC to file bankruptcy tQ .obtain a stay from the sale. In early
March 2011, I talked to Mr. Parker and was trying tQ reach Sterling tQ fmd out what they were
dQing. On March 3,2011 I learned Sterling had PQstponed the sale date fQr a week to March 10,
Affidavit .of Kameron DeLashmutt Page 6
, ., '. ," .. ' , .... ,' .
iJ.;jmlID1li~kl.ytilea· a mQtiOA1b(reQ~f1W~~~,wktb the <
. .
'IlW,tmil .'{co~to !tic ~.nver $SOO;OQti}t\ie<lUQ~~X(1t.,·
:rQfij~~Wl'Al1.~.30i 20t1. DUringt1'1~~~;r'\l;.•.. '
:stay;wassothat tlle buyeratthe'foreOl~~~~'~Q~d .
'r~~()ll ('Qneyear aftelteInmid), I ttb$j$.tQ~~thatm¢
ofi~year a~~dltn~~;' "~~~ri~although the COun1;YJaterl>acltw,~way\ftomthat '.
posItion ahaagreea"tbatih~"~~~()deadlinetoinjt1ate the FMI' remand. Howev~,tbe
Countys iillii,hl:PQ$1AAh ~~maferi1d dti'ver behi;nd the aggressive effort by Loyal L3Ild., LtC
to quicklygetJeUefiftom·Stay.
IS. The'prilnal'Y lS$Ue'!Qn'rernl:J4d ofthe FMP was the locatioIi oflands to be utilized
for wildlife~IDiti,gatiQi1. The'~tp'~d'Qrderrequired that the BLM advise TRe as·tQpotential
IQCations for WiI<l1ife ~fMlti()~~>nBLM land. However, BLM could not provide that
infonnauOrt, unfilitcbtripleted its Clme Buttes Area Recreation Plan. Despite BLM'g promises
thatthe Plan would 'be cotnpJet~nlUch earlier, BLM did not m fact advise IRe ofpotential
wildlife mitigatioD'sites lllltll,Febnmry 23, 2011 atthe earliest, six months after the FMPwas
remanded and oruymne montb~b3t'oreUte CMP was due to expire.
19. I can state without hesitation that at all times from the inception of the company
until the foreclOsure sale in August 2011, 1 did everything possible. given the circumstances~to
push the ThombUtgh Resort along as fast 3$ 'possible, taking significant risks that many other
developers would not take at extreme cost. in furtherance ofthe project. 1ms included; costs of
the CMP. filmg for FMP appmval and defending it on numerous appeals, even while the eMP
Affidavit of Kameron DeLashmutt Page 7
I l I
t
i
wasrillOit~do~$.lgnificalit onsit'~eQnstrUctions, whieh incl.udedconsfiU~g th~ SLM
ROW m.''' J"'~~ .' ntsmestin 'bstantiai su:msDltbthe .. rls'.,. to eel ~~I'aecess~ ., v. tg$1 ...'.' . ',,<:.,;'teSO .
~._~.inellldw;.bWng.world class go1fdesignet$;~t,d.:P~lm~iBexIJ
,', H' •
~D$litw:~dtomW~tG desigo,.l'Q~'~ then beghHX>Dstruction;activities~tbeii'go1f
co~s {$895,244);'Bhd;,~tion oia log lodge that wDUld.be::resp~;(}ommuuity C#1tet I
,($lA51;i23S~:spteparirig tb~ ll~A tentative Pla~ evenJ)~Qre hfl~J."~FMPt1and:t;~Q
extensivepw-deveiopll1emplanning, including extensiveengineeting,loau:smdies and.}Jlmw.fug I
for th.e tesoJ$S ~bleenergy plan, including soIal'and alternative.energy smn:ces~ In t()ta:t~ !
ImG ~~$9,83l;402onpermitting and entitlements ($4,675,151), resort ~enities
($2~S94J93)~on constructiOn ($1.205.127), and planninglpre-developmen~ activities
($1,556,931), all in furtherance of developing and building the Tho;mburgh Resort This-nearly
$10 million excludes land acquisition, finance costs, sales and marketing costs, and Gen~and
Administrative costs, which combined, were several times more.
20. DuringTRC's stewardship of this projec4 from inception to foreclosure, we
encountered adversity unlike anything seen before. Challenges that were completely outside of
its control. TRC was SUbjected to an unprecedented number of complex, detailed and exhaustive
appeals. During which the nationa1 and local economy came crashing down around TRC,
causing all sources offinancing to vanish, almost completely eliminating the market for TRe's
products and creating significant uncertainty about the proper path for project development.
TRC invested tens of millions of dollars in the Thornburgh Resort, and in spite of the incredible
challenges, took extraordinary steps to expedite the projects development. Not only could TRC
not have moved things along any faster, in retrospect its surprising TRC accomplished so much
despite such immense obstacles.
Affidavit of Kameroll DeLashmutt PageS
Affidavit of Kameron Delashmutt Page 9
05/18/2014 13:16 FAX ~001
AFFIDAVIT OF' TERRENCE LARSEN
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
CountY of IIIN./~ _ ~ 88.
I. Terrence Larse~ being first duly swom, depose and say the follo~g information that
I have knowledge of:
1. I am the sole member of Loyal Land, LLC (Loya1)~ which is the owner ofthe real
property known as the Thornburgh Resort Loyal was organized in the state of Oregon on March
7,2011. Loyal is tho applicant for a declaratory ruling that the Thornburgh Resort CMP has
been initiated, which is currently on appeal to the Deschutes County Board of County
Commissioners. This affidavit is being presented in support of this appeal.
2. 1 first became aware ofthe Thornburgh project in January 2011 when I was
introduced to leffParker in Pal.rn Springs. CA. Mr. Parker was at the Tradition Golf Clubhouse,
where 1 am a member. He was sitting with other members whom I know. At the time I was
introduced to Mr. Parker, he was discussing the Thornburgh project and what Mr. Parker saw as
the opportunities for it. Prior to that meeting I had never met nor spoken to Mr. Parker. nor had 1
ever heard of or had any involvement in Or with the Thomburgh project. Following that
introduction I had further discussions regarding the project both with Mr. Parker and others.
From Mr. Parker I learned that: (a) he was aware of a company which held a contract with
Sterling Bank for the purchase ofth.e Note secured by the trust deed on the Thornburgh property;
(b) Sterling had scheduled a trustee's sale for March, 3. 2011; and (c) if the sale took place then
Mr. Parker's interest in the Note would be lost. Mr. Parker proposed that I finance his purchase
ofthe Note prior to the foreclosure sale.
AFFIDAVIT OF TBRRRENCE LARSEN
--_..... _-
raJ 00205/18/2014 13:16 FAX
3. After speaking to a few other acquaintances about the project, I decided to visit
the property. which was probably sometime in February 2011. I also spoke to Kameron
DeLashmutt about the project a couple oftimes in February 2011. Nothing came ofthose
discussions. In early March 2011. I agreed to purchase the interest held in the Sterling Note and
trust deed for $4 million. At that point the trustee's sale was still scheduled for March 3, 2011,
so to give more time to complete the 1ransaction, the sale was postponed for one week. The
transfer documents were completed and the trustee's sale was ready to move forward on March
10. 20 11 ~ but TRC filed for bankruptcy protection that morning which automatically stayed the
sale.
4. Around the tUne of TRe's bankruptcy f1.ling, I understood the FMP for the project
had been remanded to the County on August 17, 20 I0, and had received advice that the remand
had to be initiated within one year, by August 2011. It also was my initial understanding that
Loyal needed to own the property in order to initiate that remand. Because the August 2011
deadline was only five months away, Loyal could not afford to wait long to complete the
trustee's sale. so we filed a motion for relief from stay in the Thornburgh Resort Company (IRe)
bankruptcy. During the trial on our motion it became apparent that there was in fact no such
one-year deadline under Oregon law. and that the applicant could initiate the remand whenever it
determined it to be appropriate.
5. Following Loyal's purchase of the Note, Loyal's interests and those ofTRe were
often opposite which led to extensive legal actions by all parties. On August 30, 2011, the
trustee's sale occurred and Loyal obtained title to the real property interests in the project of TRC
and Parker Group Investments, LLC (a Parker entity). After protracted negotiations, in
December 2013 Loyal entered into a settlement agreement with TRe and Mr. DeLashmutt
resolving their various disputes.
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRRENCE LARSEN
IaI 00305/18/2014 13:17 FAX
6. In summary, I can state without exaggeration that: (a) neither 1 nor Loyal had any
involvement with Jeff Parker or the Thornburgh project before January 2011 when I met Mr.
Parker in Palm Springs, nor did I or Loyal play any role whatsoever in the financial difficulties
that TRe had before that time; (b) SterJing Bank had issued its notice of default and scheduled
the trustee's sale of its trust deed on the Thornburgh property prior to any involvement by Loyal
or me; and ( c) it was my understanding that jf Loyal did not purchase Sterling's interest, then
::l:::t:=:y~mmree"~J1;:
the State. personally appeared Terrence Larsen who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory
Terrence Larsen
State of California )
County of /11 A-£(ttl )
)
On May ,c,t 2014 before me, r'M RO'1QII •a Notary Public in and for
evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same in his authorized capacity, and that by his signature on the
instnunont the person, or the entity upon behalf of which the person acted, executed the
instrument.
I certify under penalty ofperjUl')' under the laws ofthe State of California that the foregoing
paragraph is 1rUe and correct.
WTINESS my hand and official seal.
Signature 1'"", J,,2
0J7117/OOOO11SS4J016v2
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRRENCE LARSEN
r;'" •.
L A c K
H E L T E R L N E LLP
ATTDRNItYa A'ND gaUNSELQ·R8 AT LAW
PBTBR LIVINGSTON
D1RECTDIAL: (503)417-2153
E-mail: pl@bhlaw.com
Admltled In Bar -Oregon and Washington
May 13,2014
Board of County Commissioners
Deschutes County
1300 N.W. Wall Street,2nd Floor
Bend, OR 97701
Reference: Thornburgh Resort
A-13-8, DR 11-8
Dear Commissioners:
I am writing in support ofthe appellant in this proceeding.
Kameron DeLashmutt, the principal of Thornburgh Resort Company
("Thornburgh") retained my former law fIrm, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, PC ("Schwabe"),
in 2004 to represent him in the land use process associated with the application for a destination
resort ("Thornburgh Resort") in the County. Until Schwabe resigned as counsel for Thornburgh
in 2010, I worked closely with Mr. DeLashmutt as Thornburgh's principal land use counsel.
During the period that Schwabe represented Thornburgh, we prepared and fIled
two applications, one for a conceptual master plan ("CMP'j in 2005 and one for a fInal master
plan ("FMP") in 2007 (revised 2008). There were two lengthy, tumultuous hearings before a
hearings officer, Anne Corcoran Briggs, and one more before the Board on the CMP application.
There was another lengthy, only slightly less tumultuous hearing before Hearings Officer Briggs
on the FMP application. The County's CMP decision of approval, including fmdings, was
approximately 100 pages long. The record in the CMP application file was well over 5,000
pages long.
Starting in January 2006, there were four appeals to LUBA associated with the
two applications, which led to three appeals to the Oregon Court of Appeals and one appeal to
the Oregon Supreme Court. The great majority of the issues raised in these appeals were decided
in Thornburgh's favor. Nevertheless, the size ofthe fIles on appeal and the complexity ofthe
issues in two of the appeals resulted in unusual, costly delays. For example, because of
numerous objections filed by opponents to both the original record and the subsequent, first
aos SOUTHWEST aRCAOWAY • SUITE 1900' PCRTLA~D OREGON 97205·3359
Ts:!...ItPHDNE aC3.224.5!S60 f"AC9tMILE 503.224 .. 6149 WWW.SHl..AW.COM
Board of County Commissioners
May 13,2014 -Page 2
supplemental record, it took almost a year, instead ofthe usual 21 days, before the record in the
frrst CMP proceeding was settled and briefing to LUBA could begin. LUBA, in turn, required
about five months, instead of the usual 11 weeks, to issue an opinion. There was at least one
ongoing appeal during the entire time between the County's CMP approval in January 2006 and
the Court of Appeals' third opinion, which remanded the FMP to LUBA in February 2010,1
Consequently, there was not a single moment during those four years (January 2006 to February
2010) when Thornburgh and Schwabe were not in some doubt about how the applications would
or could progress.
Because, in its first CMP opinion, the Court of Appeals interpreted the law
applicable to phased developments more strictly than Thornburgh (or LUBA) had expected, it
was necessary on remand for Thornburgh to do detailed wildlife and fish studies that were
challenged in every possible way by opponents. The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM")
assured Thornburgh that it could mitigate for environmental impacts on BLM land as soon as the
Cline Buttes Recreation Area Plan ("CBRAP'') was completed. Unfortunately, the BLM's
estimate of the likely CBRAP completion date was several years off-target, which meant that
even when the FMP application was approved by Hearings Officer Briggs in 2009, Thornburgh
could not identify exactly where wildlife mitigation would occur. Consequently, first LUBA and
then the Court of Appeals found that, despite its best efforts, Thornburgh still had not met the
requirements ofDCC 18.113.070(D). When I ceased work for Thornburgh in February 2010, the
CBRAP still was not completed? .
Thornburgh was the first destination resort applicant in the region to trigger the
steadfast, determined opposition it encountered. While the opponents certainly were not at fault
in exercising their legal rights to object and raise new issues, that does not mean Thornburgh was
at fault in failing to anticipate the great expense and long delays that ensued. In my experience,
the appeals process associated with a development application typically takes about a year,
including remands and even subsequent appeals, although two appeals of the same application
are rare. In Thornburgh's case, the appeals process associated with the CMP alone took from
January 2006 to October 2009. The FMP process, from application to remand by the Court of
Appeals, took from August 2007 to February 2010. While Hearings Officer Green is correct that
the FMP process is normally simpler and less time-consurning than the CMP process, this just
was not true in Thornburgh's case. This FMP application, like the CMP application, was not
normal. The one issue deferred from the CMP to the FMP wildlife mitigation -could not be
resolved even after almost three years, due to the delays associated with the BLM's late adoption
of the CBRAP. Given the opposition Thornburgh has encountered and the difficulty inherent in
I LUBA then remanded to the County in August 2010. .
2 This should have been clear from the record to the hearings officer, Karen H. Green.
Board of County Commissioners
May 13,2014 -Page 3
preparing land use applications of the magnitude of the CMP and FMP applications, with so
many criteria to meet, so many findings to prepare, so much evidence to supply and so many
opportunities for objection, there is good reason to believe that every time period established by
statute or ordinance will be fully used in the future, as in the past, and, more likely than not, will
have to be extended.
The unusually long delays that resulted from the strong local opposition and
opponents' appeals made.potential investors anxious and triggered conflicts between existing
investors, which in tum made it virtually impossible for Thornburgh to attract new investors.
The unprecedented decline and ultimate national collapse of the real estate market, began in July
2006, not 2008, as stated bl Hearings Officer Green, with matters growing increasingly and
alarmingly worse in 2007. These economic events turned what might have been a major
headache for a developer (strong development resistance from neighbors) under normal
circumstances into a financial catastrophe. Thornburgh Resort was not the only destination
resort development in the area to suffer. In Crook County, development of the Remington
Resort halted in 2006; after the general plan for the Crossing Trails resort was approved in
December 2008, the project was shelved.4 Pronghorn and Brasada Ranch also faced
extraordinary difficulties, which still linger. All of these resorts were represented by competent
counsel and had experienced developers. Many other resort developments around the country
have met the same fate.
"Fault" is a subjective standard, but it is generally defined as a moral weakness or
failing, a mistake, a misdemeanor,a responsibility for wrongdoing or failure. In this case, the
''fault'' found by Hearings Officer Green in Thornburgh's case is apparently the failure to meet a
schedule that could not be met. Mr. DeLashmutt and Thornburgh pushed the project forward as
hard as anyone conceivably could have. For example, even while the CMP was on appeal,
Thornburgh began the FMP application process, taking the substantial financial risk that if the
CMP decision were remanded again, it would jeopardize any FMP approval that might have
been obtained. Thornburgh pushed forward with the FMP application knowing that -as it turned
out the BLM might be inaccurate in stating a completion date for the CBRAP. Without
exaggeration, I can say that there was not one day in the more than four years that Schwabe
represented Thornburgh when Mr. DeLashmutt's relentless push on all fronts to complete the
project waivered. In my view, Thornburgh was not at fault in any way for failing to meet the
3 See: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Final Report ofthe National Commission on the Causes ofthe
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, Official Government Edition (2011), pp. 4, 17,22-24,187-88,
203-04,212-15,221,226,233-35.
4 In recognition ofthe economic situation, Crook County increased the amount oftime available for extensions to
12 years. See Crook County Code 18.04.080 and 18.160.070.
Board of County Commissioners
May 13,2014 -Page 4
deadlines that LUBA has found apply to the satisfaction of the conditions imposed in theCMP
approval.
Please include my letter in the record of this local appeal proceeding.
Very truly yours,
r~ LlNWff'T;...
Peter Livingston
PL:res
836647
Deschutes County Board of Commissioners
Thornburgh Resort Appeal
June 4,2014
File No.A-14-1
Loyal Land, LLC -Appellant
David J. Petersen, Counsel for Appellant
Tonkon Torp LLP
1600 Pioneer Tower
888 SW Fifth Avenue
Portland, OR 97204
Initial Considerations
• This is, at essence, an appeal requiring an explanation of what several
provisions of the DCC mean
• To interpret the DCC, the Hearings Officer was bound by instructions
from LUBA on remand
• Hearings Officer decision, pp. 14-15:
• I~t the outset, the Hearings Officer finds there are ambiguities in
LUBA's directions on remand."
• Two-page discussion of internal inconsistencies in LUBA's analysis
• Board of Commissioners is not so bound (ORS 197.829)-Board does not
need to defer to LU BA. The Board has final say on interpretation of the
DCC.
• Hearings Officer was also limited by her conclusion that she could not
consider new evidence (p. 27), but Board is not so limited
Permitting DR's Under DCC Chapter 18.113
18.113.040. Application Submission. The authorization of a permit for a
destination resort shall consist of three steps.
A. Conceptual Master Plan and Conditional Use Permit for Destination
Resort ....
B. Final Master Plan . The applicant shall prepare a final master plan (FMP)
which incorporates all requirements of the County approval for the CMP....
C. Site Plan Review . Each element or development phase of the destination
resort must receive additional approval through the required site plan
review (DCC 18 .124) or subdivision process (DCC Title 17) ....
18.113.050. Requirements for Conditional Use Permit and Conceptual
Master Plan Applications.
The CMP provides the framework for development of the destination resort
and is intended to ensure that the destination resort meets the
requirements of DCC 18.113.
Permitting DR's Under Dec Chapter 18.113
• For decades numerous resorts were successfully planned, permitted and
operated under the 3 step process by developers, county planners and
staff
• In the 3 step process, the CMP provides the framework
• Now the previous decades of how the County interprets its code is being
challenged. How?
• By replacing the 3-step process with the general two-year
requirement to initiate all land use permits under DCC
22.36.010.B.1: "a land use permit is void two years after the date the
discretionary decision becomes final if the use approved in the
permit is not initiated within that time period."
• Is this consistent with the CMP as a framework? No.
• Why does Ms. Gould support this approach?
• Because this approach voids the Thornburgh CMP, and it will
effectively eliminate resort developments PLUS other multi-phase,
complex projects
Brief Chronology: How Did We Get Here?
conceptual Master Plan
2/18/2005 CMP application filed
5/10/2006 CMP approved by Board
2006-2008 Appeals of CMP to LUBA and Ct. of Appeals by Ms. Gould
4/15/2008 CMP approved by Board on remand
2008-2009 Further appeals by Ms. Gould
12/9/2009 CMP approval becomes final
Days between initial BOCC approval and final CMP: 1,310
Hard costs to developer: $2,269,095
Final Master Plan
4/21/2008 FMP application filed
10/8/2008 FMP approved
2009-2010 appeals of FMP to LUBA and Ct. of Appeals by Ms. Gould
8/17/2010 FMP remanded by LUBA re wildlife issues
2/23/2011 (at earliest) BLM identified wildlife mitigation sites
Days between application filing and remand: 849
Hard costs to developer: $1,494,892
Chronology Continued
Other Permits (required prior to final FMP approval)
DEQ WPCF Permit
ODWR Water Rights Permit
Annexation into the Redmond RFPD
DHS Drinking Water Permit
BLM Right of Way Permit
Hard costs to developer: $1,024,016 (pre-construction only; additional
$575,000 to build BLM road)
Ms. Gould appealed (and lost) both the water rights permit and the BLM
right of way permit
Chronology Continued
Initiation of CMP
8/30/2011
11/1/2011
11/18/2011
4/12/2012
1/8/2013
6/12/2013
12/23/2013
3/18/2014
3/31/2014
4/9/2014
Loyal Land acquires most of project by foreclosure
Loyal Land files application for declaratory ruling that
CMP has been initiated (DR-11-8)
CMP expired (per LUBA decision 1/8/13)
Hearings Officer determines CMP has been initiated
LUBA remands initiation decision back to County
(LUBA Case No. 2012-42)
Ct. of Appeals affirms LUBA without opinion
Loyal Land initiates remand (A-13-8)
Hearings Officer determines CMP has not been initiated
Loyal Land files this appeal
Board agrees to hear appeal de novo as to whether
the CMP was initiated pursuant to DCC 22.36.020.A.3
D e e 22.36 .020.A.3
Development action undertaken under a land use approval ... has been
"initiated" if it is determined that:
(3) Where construction is not required by the approval, the conditions of a
permit or approval have been substantially exercised and any failure to
fully comply with the conditions is not the fault of the applicant.
Two key elements:
• "conditions of a permit or approval have been substantially exercised "
• "any failure to fully comply with the conditions is not the fault of the
applicant "
Conditions of Approval
CMP effectively has 41 conditions of approval -original approval had 38
conditions, but one condition (#14) has five parts A through E, and one
condition (#28) was deleted on remand
• 19 conditions have been fully exercised (1, 3, 8, 9,10, 11, 13, 14A, 148,
14E, 15, 19, 22, 23, 24, 30, 32, 36 and 37)
• 1 condition has been substantially exercised (38)
• None of above findings challenged on appeal
• Remaining 21 conditions are at issue
Hearings Officer's Decision -Key Findings
Fault of Applicant
• For the remaining 21 conditions:
• in every case the Hearings Officer held that the condition imposed
an obligation contingent upon an approved FMP or later land use
approval
• in every case the Hearings Officer found the applicant at fault for
the non-occurrence of the contingency
Substantial Exercise
• Defined as {(performing or carrying out a condition of approval to a
significant degree but not entirely"
• Must be determined {(viewed as a whole" rather than as applied to each
individual condition
• {(Substantial exercise" did not exist based solely on the 20 conditions she
found either fully complied with or substantially exercised
Errors as to Fault: Contingent Conditions
Error #1: Hearings Officer held that conditions that cannot be exercised
without later DR approvals are contingent conditions
• Many are not contingent conditions at all
• Many are restated verbatim in the FMP
• directly contradicts three-step permitting process for DRs
• directly contradicts approved 10 to 12 year CMP phasing plan for
Thornburgh approved by the Board
Errors as to Fault: Contingent Conditions
Error #2: Hearings Officer held that when a condition of approval imposes a
contingent obligation, and the contingency has not yet occurred, the non
occurrence of the contingency must not be the applicant's fault
• Not supported by language of DCC 22.36.020.A.3
• Contrary to lUBA Decision 2012-42 ('Imay be sufficient ... to find that
failure to comply ... is not the fault of the applicant because the
contingency that would trigger obligations ... does not and may never
exist.")
• Effectively rewrites DCC Chapter 18.113 and the Thornburgh CMP
• in every case the contingency that has not yet occurred is a final,
approved FMP or later land use approval
• her interpretation requires those approvals be obtained , and the
action in the condition taken , within two years of approval of CMP
unless failure to complete within two years is not applicant 's fault
• tolled only by CMP appeals
Errors as to Fault: Contingent Conditions
Consequences:
• Prohibits imposing any condition of approval on a CMP that cannot be
fully exercised within two years
• Takes away County's discretion to impose a phasing plan longer than two
years
• Effectively prevents DRs or any other complex, multi-phase projects in
Deschutes County
• Three-step process cannot realistically be met in two years
• Gives opponents veto power
• Forces County to abandon meaningful management of complex
projects and effective mitigation of impacts
Specific to the Thornburgh project, the ruling:
• Means the applicant should have violated the phasing plan and condition
of approval #1, and instead built the whole project in two years
• Retroactively creates impossible-to-meet conditions
• Works a tremendous injustice
Errors of Fact as to Applicant's Fault
Error #3: Hearings Officer held that the applicant is at fault for failure to
satisfy the contingencies preventing full exercise of all conditions
• in every case the contingency that has not yet occurred is a final,
approved FMP or later land use approval
Applicant not at fault for five reasons:
1. Delay in BLM identification of wildlife mitigation sites . This
prevented any action on FMP remand from 8/17/2010 until at least
2/23/2011, less than 9 months before CMP due to expire.
• 1,310 days to get from BOCC approval to final CMP
• 849 days to get from application to FMP remand, which did not toll
eM P expi ration
• Likely will be further FMP appeals
Errors of Fact as to Applicant's Fault
2. Gould Appeals . Hearings Officer held that Gould cannot be faulted
for filing appeals, but this does not mean that the applicant is at fault for the
resulting delay.
• Procedural and record objections caused substantial delays
• Overwhelming majority of assignments of error denied
• Only CMP appeals tolled expiration of CMP
3. DR Approval Process . Under DCC 18.113 the remaining conditions
could not realistically be exercised in two years.
• Tolling of CMP two-year deadline ended on 12/9/2009; CMP expired
11/18/2011 but project could not advance until 2/2011
• Hearings Officer decision requires full exercise of conditions within
those two years
• Simply impossible to achieve all remaining approvals and construct
the full project by 11/18/2011, even without other delays (i.e.
appeals, BLM)
• Hearings Officer findings to the contrary (pp. 30-31) are absurd
Errors o f Fact as to Applicant's Fault
4. Relentless Pursuit of Approvals . In spite of all challenges,
developer acted always in good faith, took significant risks and pursued
approvals at breakneck speed.
• Nine-month window between BLM identification of mitigation sites
(2/23/2011) and CMP expiration (11/18/2011) only existed at all due
to significant risks taken by TRC
• FMP application filed 4/21/08 rather than 12/10/09
• If filed 12/10/09, remand would have occurred 849 days later
on 4/7/2012
• See Delashmutt affidavit, Livingston letter, tentative plat
5. Great Recession . Global and local economic calamity from 2007
2011 eliminated available capital and potential markets.
• Hearings Officer implausibly found no causal link in the record
between the Great Recession and project delays
• Substantial evidence of link already in the record
• Additional evidence of link submitted for this de novo hearing
• Erroneous factual findings of Hearings Officer contradicted by
the record and new evidence
Impact o f the Grea t Recession
Hearings Officer decision (p. 29): "there is no evidence in the record of a
direct connection between the general economic downturn which began in
2008 and Thornburgh's financial difficulties which the record indicates clearly
predated the recession."
• Fundamentally misunderstands the evidence already in the record and
the actual facts of the recession
• Peterson report:
• Top Central Oregon economic analyst for real estate development
• "Great Recession" began with trouble in subprime mortgage market
in 2006 (not 2008)
• Bear Stearns collapse in July 2007 sent "shock waves" through the
financial community
• Central OR experienced one of the fiercest boom-and-bust cycles;
resort financing vanished
• From 2007 to 2011, average sales prices at area resorts dropped
79% and annual developer lot sales fell from 56 to 3
• Evidence submitted to Hearings Officer but not considered shows
that project value slid from $50mm to $8mm between 2006 and
2011 (lost $14 mm alone in two months Sept. to Nov. 2007)
Impact of the Great Recession
• Peterson report (p. 10):
"Even if a developer was financially able to move forward with
additional entitlements, planning and permitting actions, in the middle
of that environment [between 2007 and 2011}, anything they did would
likely be a waste of time, and money. By 2011 Thornburgh was on the
edge of bankruptcy, fighting for survival. For it to have redirected its
efforts and pursued further permitting until market conditions
warranted would have been ridiculous."
• Other considerations:
• Jeff Parker has never had any financial or ownership interest in Loyal
Land
• Loyal Land and its owner Mr. Larsen had no knowledge of the
project until January 2011, long after the financial slide began
Other Er rors Related to Fault
Full Compliance Does Not Mean Full Exercise
• Full compliance with conditions is possible without full exercise
• Example: condition #7 -"all new proposed road names must be reviewed
and approved by the Property Address Coordinator prior to final plat
approval."
• Full compliance exists = no final plat has been approved without
prior road name approval
• Full exercise does not exist =applicant has not obtained road name
approval
But, Hearings Officer found failure to fully comply with condition #7.
In fact, all contingent conditions have been fully complied with because
none of the contingencies that would allow exercise have yet occurred.
Only condition 38 is not fully complied with and therefore fault analysis
applies only to that condition
• Applicant not at fault due to BLM delay
Other Errors Related to Fault
"Any/} Failure Does Not Mean "All" Failures
• "Fault" test met if anyone failure to fully comply is not the fault of the
applicant
• Hearings Officer held that "fault" test met only if applicant not at fault for
failure to fully comply with all conditions
Prohibitive Conditions Do Not Impose Affirmative Obligations
• Hearings Officer found four conditions that solely prohibit action (16, 18,
20, 34) are affirmative conditions subject to contingencies
• Example: condition #18 -uNo development shall be allowed on slopes of
25% or more on the site."
• Hearings Officer instead found this condition to impose affirmative
obligation contingent on final FMP approval and therefore not fully
complied with
• Hearings Officer also found that this condition not substantially
exercised because the applicant did not "provide development on
the resort outside slopes of 25% or more"
• Conditions 16, 20, 34 prohibit temporary structures, excessive density
and disturbance of native vegetation
Errors Related to Substantial Exercise
Elimination of any significance for the word "substantial"
• ((substantial exercise" of a condition does not require full
performance
• Hearings Officer decision p. 33: "Substantial exercise as I have
defined it -i. e., performing or carrying out a condition of
approval to a significant degree but not completely -cannot
reasonably be expanded to include performance of prerequisite
acts rather than the specific actions required by the condition."
Greater weight given to exercise of certain conditions over others, without
authority
Finding of no substantial exercise "viewed as a whole" not supported by the
evidence
• Significant progress has occurred at hard cost > $9.8 million
(Delashmutt affidavit ~ 20)
• Every condition that could have been performed before CMP
expiration, has been fully performed (except only condition 38
which has been substantially exercised)
Decision Violates State and County Law
• Hearings OfficerJs finding that the CMP expires after two years under DCC
22.36.010.B.l violates State and County law
• ORS 21S.43S(2)(a) sets no deadline for applicant to initiate the FMP
remand
• Initial County misinterpretation of this statute created false
urgency in TRCJs bankruptcy (see larsen affidavit ~ 4J
Delashmutt affidavit ~ 17)
• DCC 18.113.030 prohibits DR uses without a final J approved FMPJ
but Hearings Officer effectively requires uses to exist within two
years of CMP approval
• Where does this leave the three-step DR process?
Policy Implication s
Do the rules for initiation of permits override the three-step destination
resort approval process?
• DCC 18.113 (specific) -DRs subject to complicated, extensive, three-step
approval process and allows for extended phasing
• DCC 22.36.010.B.1 (general) -land use approvals expire in two years
unless initiated at that time
How does the two-year rule apply to a DR? How is the longstanding three
step DR process still viable if the decision stands?
Does the County expect all conditions to a CMP to be fully exercised within
two years, unless there is a valid excuse?
How will the decision impact the County's ability to effectively manage
future complex projects?
Will the County punish the applicant for failing to achieve impossible results
in an unrealistic time frame?
Policy Implications
What is the better approach?
• The Hearings Officer got it right the first time (2014 decision p. 23) -the
21 remaining conditions (plus 6 others) "were not relevant to the
initiation of [the CMPj primarily because the CMP approval decision
specified times for compliance with these conditions that were after CMP
approval."
• LUBA fundamentally misinterpreted the Dee in a way that makes DR's
functionally impossible
• Hearings Officer obligated to follow LUBA, but the Board is not
• Those conditions that could be exercised, or by their terms must be
exercised, prior to FMP approval are the only conditions relevant to
initiation of the CMP under DCC 22.36.020.A.3
• This harmonizes Dee 18.113 three-step process with the two-year
deadline and initiation rules in Dee 22.36
Conclusion
Hearings Officer Errors
• Fundamental misapplication of the Dec giving priority almost exclusively
to DeC 22.36 over DeC 18.113
• Hamstrung by LUBA's misunderstanding of the Dec
• Multiple significant errors, both legal and factual
End Result
• A completely unworkable interpretation of the Dec if complex projects
like DRs are going to occur in Deschutes County subject to meaningful
oversight and mitigation
• Misinterpretation of the evidence and injustice to the applicant
Better Outcome
• A sensible, balanced interpretation of the Dec in a way that harmonizes
the two chapters of the Dec and makes DRs and other complex projects
workable and achievable within customized time frames
GY:
LANDWATCH
IJtUVERED BY:
June 3, 2014
Board of Commissioners
Deschutes County
1300 NW Wall St.
Bend, OR 97701
Re: Remand Hearing on File No. DR-11-8; Loyal Land LLC
Dear Board of County Commissioners:
I am writing on behalf of Central Oregon LandWatch in opposition to the Loyal Land
remand argument in support of its claim of initiation of use of the Thornburgh
Destination Resort.
This case squarely presents an example of why we have rules that provide for the
expiration of permits. The approval criteria for a Conceptual Master Plan (CMP)
require proof of a developer's wherewithal to develop the proposed resort, traffic
studies to predict traffic impacts over the next two decades and infrastructure needs
and other information regarding impacts of a resort.
Most of the information on which the Thornburgh Resort CMP was based is 10 years
old and outdated. Economic, traffic and other conditions have changed over the past
decade. The original developer, Thornburgh, filed for bankruptcy and there has been
no showing that Loyal Land can carry out the development or has the water and
other permits that were required of Thornburgh.
The Resort CMP approval expired in November of 2011 and Loyal Land was at fault
for not seeking an extension of the CMP approval and for not initiating a remand of
the Final Master Plan (FMP).
Please inform me of any decisions on this matter. Thank you for this opportunity to
testify.
Very truly yours,
~c!'-----
Gail Snyder,
Program Director
www.centraioregonlandwatch.org
o
Deschutes County Board of Commissioners
Thornburgh Resort Appeal
June 4, 2014
File No. A-14-1
Applicant's Exhibits Submitted at Hearing
1. Self-Contained Appraisal Report, September 19,2007
2. "Thornburgh Runs Into Hurdle," Bend Bulletin, November 8, 2007
3. Self-Contained Appraisal Report, November 15,2007
4. Conditions of Approval, Thornburgh Resort Final Master Plan, October 8,2008
0371 17/0000115583307v 1
o
SELF-CONTAINED
APPRAISAL REPORT
1,982 Acres of EFU Zoned Land with
Destination Resort Overlay
Located Along Cline Falls Road, Redmond, Oregon
Date of Value -September 19,2007
Prepared For:
Kenneth Davis
Sterling Savings Bank
312 SE Stone Mill Drive, Suite 135
Vancouver, WA 98684
Prepared Bl'.·
Jeremy L. Cowan
Dana L. Bratton, MAl
Bratton Appraisal Group LLC
25 NW Hawthorne Avenue
Bend, Oregon 97701
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,r "";;:"~ mi \T: (l\
(' 5iJf' , -'I' \'
-i: \: -~ ,
eXPERT., IS 1lE -\1 E.5T:1TF ':V·i) l"iS
25 N\V Hawthorne A,"c.
ilel1d. On....--gOIl Q7701
4050.\\ ! ]11: he \;,: Lj~,
f\!(inh'1r1,J. l )re~ll'l ~;i-;(-.
Dana Dr-uml1. MAl
Mike Cabn. MM
Jeremy (.nwan
C:tl Clahrrl
Nji\ncy lr:lhcM. SR..\
Grrgt1ry Jones
Mich<:k Payne
Dt:bordh Scblntcr
~u.s.an Smith
ScOtl Thomas
Mafi!>f-r>1J1C{'
\Vows J()nt~
Bout ,41 ~!l" 22"
'LL\: 54LJ~9.t'lt1i /
wwv••brflltOnarrraisal.fOIl1
September 21, 2007
Kenneth Davis
Sterling Savings Bank
312 SE Stone Mill Drive. Suile 135
Vancouver, W A 98684
RE: Valuation of 1.982 Acres of Destination Resort Land Located Along Cline
Falls Road. Redmond. Oregon.
Dear Mr. Davis:
Enclosed is the .veif-c()/'Jlained appraisal report of the property identified above. The
purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the market value of the "fee simple estate" of
the subje<:t property. in light of market conditions in effect on September 19. 2007.
The intended use of this appraisal is to assist lending representatives with Sterling
Savings Bank in regard to utilization of the subje<:t property as collateral for a real
estate secured loan.
A physical inspection of the property was made on September 19,2007. The subje<:t
property consists of a 1.982 acre parcel ofEFU owned land with a "Destinatioll Resort
Overlay" covering 1.970 acres. The site has been described within the body of this
report.
This appraisal has been written to conform with the Uniform Standards of Professional
ApJXaisal Practice (U5PAP) set forth by the Appraisal Standards Board of the
Appraisal Foundation and adopted by the State of Oregon, and is consistent with
requirements ofScction 323.4 of Title XI of the Federal financial Institution's Refonn.
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (fIRREA). This appraisal is intended to be
utiliT.ed in all federally related transactions.
All factors believed to have an impact on the market value of this property have been
analyzed and it is our opinion that the current market value of the "foe simple estate"
of this property is Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000)."
Photographs of the subject property are contained in the addenda of this report. Thank
you for this opportunity to be of service.
Sincerely.
~---~.---.Jeremy L. Cowan Dana L. Bratton, MAl
Stall: Certified Appraiser #C-000889 State Certified Appraiser#C-000021
"This value i. based on !be eXlrOOrdinary as5UIJlption !hat lhe subject I'fOP"rty will reccive Final Masler
Plan approval 01\ ." belOre January 15. 2008. In irs =t -...< is" condition. we believe that market
participants would pure""" the property for SSO.OOO.OOO a.".uning that the entitlements are in pi""".
Please see the Special Is."""" section ofthis rep;>r1 for further informaliOf!.
SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
PROPERTY LOCATION
TAX ACCOUNT #
OWNERS OF RECORD
LA.lIiD AREA
IMPROVEMENTS
ZONING
HIGHEST AND BEST USE
As Is
VALUE ESTrMA.TE
DATE OF INSPECTION
DATE OF REPORT
ESTATE VALllED
TYPE OF DOCl.lMENT
APPRAISERS
1,982 acres near Cline Fall" Road, Redmond Oregon
15 12 00 5000, 5001, 5002 7700(1) and 7700(2),
770 I, 7800, 7801, 7900 and. 8000
Thornburgh Resort Company, LLC
Parker Group Investments, LLC, et al
1,982 Acres
There are two wood frame residential structures and
several outbuildings. No value has heen placed on the
structural improvements.
EFU-3 with "Destination Resort Overlay"
The Highest and Best use of the subject property "as
is" is to hold the property and pursue entitlements and
approvals to construct a destination resort.
$50,000.000'"
Septemher 19,2007
September 21, 2007
Fee Simple Estate
Se(f~C(}ntained Appraisal Report
Jeremy L. Cowan
State Certified Appraiser #C-000889
Dana L. Bratton, MAl
State C ertiti ed Appraiser #C-000021
25 NW Hawthorne Ave., Bend, Oregon 97701
'This value i. bosed 00 the extraordinary assumption that the subject property will receIve Final Mll.'ter Plan
approvaJ on or before January 15.2008. In its current ~'9$ is'" conditio". ""'c bc)Jcvc that markel participants
would purchase tile prop.:rty for $50,000,000 assuming that tbe entitlements are in place. Plcase see the Special
Issues section "fthis report for further information.
._____.__..-'-___._JI
o o-~····~
PRELIMINARY DATA
PROPERTY LOCATION
The subject property is identified as Deschutes County Assessor's Map # 15
1200 tax lots 5000,5001,5002, 7700(1), 7700(2), 7701, 7800, 7801, 7900,
and 8000, Deschutes County, Oregon. A reduced copy of the Deschutes
County Assessor's tax map highlighting the location and configuration of the
subject property is set forth below:
27
"~I I
! I 35
:if~ 1 Y
2
Thornburgh runs into hurdle IThe Bulletin () o
" :
Buttes
V;:..:I\~
Thornburgh runs into hurdle
Developers must show resort won't have negative impact on
wildlife
By
Cindy Powers I The Bulletin
Published: November 08.2007 5:00AM PST
http://www.bendbulletin.comiapps!pbcs.dll1artic1e.!AID-/20071108INEWSO 11711 080446 (2 of 7) 11/812007 7;45: 39 AM
Thornburgh runs into hurdle I The Bulletin 0 o
The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled Wednesday that developers of a proposed destination resort near
Tumalo need a concrete plan, subject to public review, showing it will not negatively impact wildlife.
The decision stems from an appeal filed by neighbors opposing Thornburgh Resort, a proposed
destination resort on 2,000 acres along the Cline Falls Highway between Bend and Redmond expected to
have 950 homes and three golf courses.
Deschutes County commissioners gave initial approval to the resort in February 2006.
The ruling isn't expected to stop the development. Thornburgh partner Kameron DeLashmutt said
Wednesday that the ruling -along with an earlier decision by the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals
-will serve as guides about what changes they need to make before seeking final approval from
Deschutes County.
"We're thrilled -it is the step that we have been waiting on and it gives us the path to finish the issues
with LUBA and get our final master plan and move on," DeLashmutt said.
Wednesday's decision was the result of an appeal ofa May ruling by the Oregon Land Use Board of
Appeals. LUBA found the resort's initial application lacking in four areas, but took no issue with
Thornburgh's approach to mitigating its impact on wildlife.
To address the wildlife concerns, Thornburgh developers had entered into an agreement with the Oregon
Department ofFish and Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management. The agreement requires
Thornburgh to conduct a wildlife impact study and complete a wildlife mitigation plan showing that "any
negative impact on fish and wildlife resources will be completely mitigated so that there is no net loss or
http://www.bendbulIetin.com/appslpbcs.dWarticle?AID=/200711 08INEWSO 11711 080446 (3 0[7) 11I8/2007 7:45 :39 AM f
t
I
Thornburgh runs into hurdle I The Bulletin 0 o
net degradation of the resource."
But the study and the plan were never completed. When Thornburgh's application came before the
county, it only included statements that the developers had identified a wildlife management area and
were "working with" ODPW and BLM.
Resort opponents Nunzie Gould and Steve Munson, who live in Tumalo, appealed LUBA's finding that
the agreement was adequate to address wildlife mitigation concerns under Oregon law.
On Wednesday, the appeals court found that Thornburgh's initial application was flawed because it failed
to include a mitigation plan.
"First, the county's findings were inadequate to establish the necessary and likely content of any wildlife
impact mitigation plan," the ruling states. "Without knowing the specifics of any required mitigation
measures, there can be no effective evaluation of whether the project's effects on fish and wildlife
resources will be 'completely mitigated ... '"
Gould referred questions to her Bend attorney, Paul Dewey, and Munson could not be reached for
comment.
Reactions to decision
But lawyers for both sides said they were happy with the decision.
"We're very pleased with the court's decision because it really doesn't do anything to slow down the
project," said Portland lawyer Peter Livingston, who represents DeLashmutt's partner, California
developer David Chapman.
Dewey said Wednesday that the key issue for Gould was ensuring that the public gets a chance to see the
mitigation plan and comment on it before final approval of the destination resort.
"It's important not only for this case in the wildlife mitigation area but as a precedent for other counties
that LUBA and other counties will have to keep their eye on the ball," Dewey said.
"And the ball is the public's right to comment on this stuff."
Now the developers will need to revise the resort's application to comply with the rulings before putting
it back before the county. Livingston said his clients will conduct the wildlife impact study, revise their
application and ask commissioners for another review.
While they say it won't slow them down, the appeal has been one more hurdle along a path to approval
that has been anything but smooth.
http://www.bendbulletin.com/apps/pbcs.dlliarticle?AlD=/200711 OS/NEWSOIl7110S0446 (4 of7)11/8/2oo7 7:45:39 AM
Thornburgh runs into hurdle I The Bulletin 0 o
In November 2005, a Deschutes County hearings officer rejected the Thornburgh proposal, saying it
failed to show it could obtain enough water to supply the resort.
That decision was overturned by commissioners in 2006, in a 2-1 decision, with then-Commissioner Bev
Clarno and current Commissioner Mike Daly voting to grant land use approvaL
Daly could not be reached for comment Wednesday. Commissioner Dennis Luke, who opposed the
resort, said he could not comment on an issue that will be reviewed by the board in the future.
Commissioner Tammy Baney had not been elected to her position when the Thornburgh Resort was
approved.
The initial approval came with a list of conditions developers wou1d have to meet before commissioners
would grant final approval to the developer's master plan.
Gould and Munson appealed the commissioners' decision to LUBA.
The appeal listed problems associated with increased traffic, insufficient water, the resort's impact on
wildlife and the number of overnight lodging units that developers must build.
In May, LUBA found inconsistencies in the application and ruled that Thornburgh developers did not
adequately address road issues or how the resort would maintain the required ratio of homes to overnight
lodging under destination resort rules.
But LUBA rejected more than two dozen issues raised in the appeaL
In August, Gould and Munson asked the Oregon Court of Appeals to review that decision.
Livingston said that his clients will now make the necessary changes to their fmal master plan and ask
county commissioners for one last review.
Once the county receives the request for review, it has 90 days to make a ruling, said Deschutes County
Legal Counsel Laurie Craghead.
Cindy Powers can be reached at 617-7812 or cpowers@bendbulletin.com.
Tenns of Use • Privacy Policy • Contact Us • Comments/Questions?
http://www.bendbullctin.comiappsJpbcs.dll/articlc?AID=/20071 108lNEWSOll7l 1080446 (5 of7)11/8/2007 7:45:39 AM
o o
SELF-CONTAINED
APPRAISAL REPORT
1,826 Acres of EFU Zoned Land with
Destination Resort Overlay
Located Along Cline Falls Road, Redmond, Oregon
Date of Value November 15,2007
Prepared For:
Kenneth Davis
Sterling Savings Bank
312 SE Stone Mill Drive, Suite 135
Vancouver, WA 98684
Prepared By:
Jeremy L. Cowan
Dana L. Bratton, MAl
Bratton Appraisal Group LLC
25 NW Hawthorne Avenue
Bend, Oregon 97701
o o
EXPERTS IN REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS
25 NW Hawthorne Ave.
Bend, Oregon 97701
465 NW Elm Av't., SlC 103
Redmond. Oregon 97756
Dana Bratton, MAl
Mike Caba, MAl
Jeremy Cowan
Cal Gabert
Nancy Gabert. SRA
Gregory Jones
Michele Payne
Deborah Schlmer
Susan Smith
Scon Thomas
Marie·france
Woods Jones
Bold: 541.389.2233
fax: 541.389.6677
Redmond: 541.548.2233
fax: 541.548.8206
?'ww. brattonappraisa] .com
November 19,2007
Kenneth Davis
Sterling Savings Bank
312 SE Stone Mill Drive, Suite 135
Vancouver, WA 98684
RE: Valuation of 1,826 Acres of Destination Resort Land
Located A10ng C1ine Fans Road, Redmond, Oregon.
Dear Mr. Davis:
Enclosed is the self-contained appraisal report of the property
identified above. The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the
market value of the "fee simple estate" of the subject property, in
light of market conditions in effect on November 15, 2007. The
intended use of this appraisal is to assist lending representatives
with Sterling Savings Bank in regard to utilization of the subject
property as collateral for a rea] estate secured loan.
A physical inspection of the property was made on September 19,
2007. The subject property consists of a 1,826 acre parcel of EFU
zoned land with a "Destination Resort Overlay." The site has
been described within the body of this report.
This appraisal has been written to conform with the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USP AP) set forth by
the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation and
adopted by the State of Oregon, and is consistent with
requirements of Section 323.4 of Title XI of the Federal Financial
Institution's Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of ] 989
(FIRREA). This appraisal is intended to be utilized in all
federally related transactions.
All factors believed to have an impact on the market value of this
property have been analyzed and it is our opinion that the
o o
Kenneth Davis
Page 2
November 19, 2007
hypothetical market value of the fee simple estate of the subject property, in
light of market conditions in effect on November 15, 2007, is Forty-Five
Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($45,650,000). *
A current "as is" value, in light of market conditions in effect on November
15, 2007 is estimated to be Thirty-Six Mil1ion Five Hundred Twenty
Thousand Dollars ($36,520,000).
Photographs of the subject property are contained in the addenda of this
report. Thank you for this opportunity to be of service.
Sincerely,
Jeremy L. Cowan
State Certified Appraiser #C-000889
b~-{~tlk(j
Dana L. Bratton, MAl
State Certified Appraiser #C-000021
"'This value is based on the hypothetical condition that the subject property has received Final Master Plan
approval as of November 15,2007. Please see the Special Issues section oftbis report for further information.
o o
. ~ .v. c,
.
For the reasons 68t out above; the hearings
'
officer condudes that the proposal.satIsfies all
appflCable criteria, or that it Is feasible to ~Ule. criteria through the Implementalion of
conditions of approval. Accordingly, M 07-'1IMA.Q8.6 are approved, subfed to the foUowing
conditions. ,To ~,~~enoy among the' dedsionS, ~, ~'~~retains the
numerical,'listings ~in the BOCC'a CUP declslon~ noting 6y the won::I~·sati$fied· those
conditions that no longer apply. .
1. Approval Is based upOn the submllted plan. Any substantlai th8nge to the
approved plan wiD require ,8 new ..,plfcation.
2. AI development in the'resort shall require tentatN:8 plat approvarthrough Title 17
'. of the, ~,~,·thEHX)UQty SubclM8lonlPaiti 0RIrianc;e. and/or Site Plan
RevIeW Ifll'ough TItJe 18 of !he County Code, thi SubdivIsion Ordinance. .
• '~" :, "~lisfied,, ',',
' ..' .
, 4.. :;':, Subieci.'tq US ~,of' the"lntertor-8uteau of lind Management (aLM)
,'",:~ " :: " approval, ~Oy second_I')' .emergency, fngr8eeIegre&s'~the BLM-own8d land ,
ot ioadways,shal"b,e.,implOved toa:mIi1Imumwidt,h of 20 teet wiIh aJC..weatI1er
$Udace 'capab(. Or supportIng a 6O,OQO-I). 1m vddcte. Emergency SeCondary
, . resort access roads ahaJI be. Improved before any Final Plat approval'or iseuanoe
~a~ng,~~comesfJAit' " .... ", ' ' '
5. The developer,wfI design and constnid the road system In ~with occ
'_ ,; . n"'.17. , R~1rrtprQ'IIrnQllt plans &hal be apprOved bY. the Road ~ . , .' , ";,:, priOr to COhstructJon:. " .
, 6. All easements of record' Or right-of-ways shaIi be shown on any 'final pIal Plans
shall be approved bY the Road Department ~r~~Ir\:ICfion.'. ,', ' "
, " 1~" :,"All new'~road'~~~ ~~,be reviewed and approved by~Property
Address Coordmator priotto 'final .pIat t¥lprovaL .. :' " " , '
. .' .'. ::.', ..... a~ : 'Satisfied., .... ' ,": " ':
. ' .... .,'
9..SatfSMd~ '., '. '" .' :. .
10. Aw.i~ ~ai pRwide, 'stthe time' of ~~ each·.~planreview for~
indMdual.~oftM..re$ortdevelopment. ~~for ~. .
. ~ter right 'permitand I:!n ~or the. fUn amount of mitigation. as reqti
':under the water.IIght,. for that lndIvfdual phasi:.," .'", . .... . .
• .' • • • .?' ",'. • .., .~. • • • •
'11.' 8atiSfj~~: ", '~'... . '.... ", ,
12. 'COmmerCial, '.~~!lI~t ~~~.~~'~' Part, of the
, <, • destinatiOn resort shan be contained wilhin the development (!JJld 'shalf not be
oriented to public l'08d'W8ys. ~culuraf and entertainment uses
I , allowed wIIhin the desIfnation resort 8haII be il'ldderdal to the resort itself. AI3
such, these ~ary uses shaD be' permiIlE!lI.onIy W'a "8QaIe euIle<t to eeive
"
:.:~. 26
" ..."; '.
, " LuaA tJ.2OO8..203:.:-,
,00036... ':",",
I .
" ,.
.~'-
~ :
, ,
F
. i. ~"
t.;: :
.L'
.: ,-:
• • i
1
... _.............. ..----... _-_..... --_.;
!.
IviSitors to the resort. Compliance With this requirement shall also be:'1rlcIuded as
a cond"ltion of FMP approval.
'; .... .' " :: "
. " ',' I
.' . 14. ...Ap~c;8rit a~it.s~ns Shan do the'folfowtng to ensure ~ai o~~~
. : USeCJto 8StUre the 50% open·space f8qUlreinent of Sedlon 18.113.060 (0) (1»)s • I:' .niaIntained II'"perpebit)t:' . . .:' ..... ,. ~ l SatJsfied. '1
. .,.' . •" B: Satisfied. ...
,
, " . i
. ' .' C.' .,,":·AlI. d~i ~yfng'ali ~~ny:part of the.s~ct pro~shaD /ndude L. ~
" ,'~ .. '. .·the·foll~ng ~strictIQn:." .' ' ... : .' ." .... ;
.. 1J1Is property Is part of the 1l1ornbuIlJh R~and':iS:~ to the
p!9v1sfons of the Rnal ~Plan for TI'(.or:nbwgIJ .Reeort and ~
, ~of· CQvenanta .' Condilions' and ReatrJcfiotI "of Thornburgh .". :_..... "', Resort. The _ Maaler.P.1an and the Ded8raIiOn tonlak)'. deIIneatJon
. ::. .' of opei\' ~....·that shaH be··maflit8rn$t,I as open ~ce areas in'.;::; .~'~~.'. :.. .'.~<.. '--.-/.. '.:.. <" -:; >".,.': :.:, ..',:"-.
. . ~ .. " D.' 'All'apen sp~ ~··shaQ ..be·dearly·deIIrl8ated ancflabeled on the
, Final Plat. . .
. .,: .',' '~~.:.. ·.·AnY9U~I_;~~·~sPa~·~~~~~<JeeIslon
....:. ." will require a new land use permit ' .. :.. . "
, :1:. ~ :: I' •• ',
',~ : s~:, . ' ..:,.:, '. '
' .
16. All tempo.:&ry sttuCtUreS shdbe Imlted.to a ~m of 18 ~on'the resort .
sfte... , .. '. , .' :~.::, .., ," ' ,..., .. '~ :'1' ., " '
17. AI development witI*l the proposed ~shall meet aU ..fire proteetion.
requirements of Itie Redmond Fire Department. FIre protei:tiOn. fBqUlrements
.. shall Include aU mf~emefgency fngresslegress roadway ~ments. ' .
~
18. No development shaH be alloVJed on slopes of 25% or moo;on the ••.
. 19: .._ ...~.,~~~ "WiI~,,~..~:p~-ro:. the
....'resort. ~.~.iO:e.c. 15,' 8-29 9f·the CMP'blIidc,wi of proof statement. Prior
. ".'to approval of 880tt subdJyision and • plai\i:AppIfcant Shall oOoRJfnate.. lis
evacuation plana through that development phase with· the Deschutea .~ty
Sheriff's omce and the Redmond Fia Depanment. At the same time. Appfk:ant
$IlaIl. ~coqrdinate Is plant fOr the movement of. ~ov.(W' major
transpOrtation ro.tJte$ wIf!l tho Oregon ~POlice and ~~qn QePartment of f
TI1i~n:. ":."": ".:' '::' "'.' .. ''': .. ' .. :: : .. '" '
...•.'!. :,':-•••
, ',"." ""I' , • , " : ;."t',':!' .... ;.., ...
",:. ,:, . I
• t",'-.:.
. .: 27 . . , . .
,.,,' .
LUaA #2OQ&-20s
00037' r \
'. l
• •
i
" " .. ,," -'--..··_'1
. ',,,-,: '" 20~ , The cumUlativ6,density ,of the development at the 'enej of 'any phase'shall not
, exceed a maximum c:Iensfty of 0.72 dWelling unfts Per acre (Including residential'
dwelling unb and ,excluding visltor-ori~ted overnight I~)•. ,
21. 'Each phase of the development shall be constrUcted'such that the n~of
. overnight lodging Wllts meets the 150 QV8mlght'1odging u!1lt and 2:1 ratio of
·,tndl*uaUy owned units to overnight lodging. unIt·standan'J8 set oqt In OCC
18.113.060 CA) (1) and' 16.113.060 (0) ~). "Indivldually owned units ~be
considered visitor oriented locftjng If they are a~abIe for overnight rental ~by
the general Pf:.IbIlc for at least 45 weeks per GaIendar year through one or more
l'~: oentraI reservation and chec:k.... services. As ~by ORS 197.445 (4) (b)
" , , .-(8), at least t'IO units of ovemighi I~in~b8'co~f~ tile first phase of
< :.~ development, prior to _,closure of sale of fttdlvidua' lots or units.
q,.. , , ",,,' " ,. :I~'addition to compIyfng wIUi~specifiC r8Quiremeoia ~~18.~13.070 (U), 1:'
~ ,~ 6, ApplICant. lis 8ucoessons and assIgns. shaD at aX fknes nraintaiQ (1) B registry .
of the Individually owned units subject to ~restrictlon ~:QCC 18.113.070
~ • (U) (2), requilfrlg thet~aveJJable,forovemight lodgIng,purJ)OSeSi (2) an offtceln "
; ,
,
a" tocation reasonable convenient to reaort. vIsItoI$ as a rvservatlon and d1eek-in ~
facIlItY at·the l88ort; and (3) a "par~e·l.phone reservallon line and website In
," , " , the name of 'Thornburgh ResOrt"" to.tie, used I?Y ~ber&,of the public to make .
, : , " . "reservations.' As ,-an"a1tema~ to or .In' Qdd~,to, (3), AppICant may enter Into ,"
"
.. "
':,! '.. :' an agreement witMl firm .~'agent) 1M( 8~1fze8 in the rental of time
~ , , " iharing, of resort .property; prrividirig that Applicant will shere the iofonna(ion In' .'
~ ~::! ' ,'".,;,"; ·the"reglstry reqtJirad,bY (1) and':ccio~~ Witb'the booJdng agent to solicit .. , , l'fJ8efV8tions for available overnight lodgfoo at 100 resort. If App8cant c::ontracbJ
.........
'. ), with a bpaklne,. agent ApplIcant and the boOIdng:8gent shall Co~to enstn
~ r comptlanoe wiIh the requhment& of DCC ,~11.3.070 (U) (6), ,by fling 8 report on
> I
" .January 1 of each yearWllh the ~ute8 Cot,Jnty Planning OMslon. .
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...:, ,:'22" ..The fln8i coveoants. -con<rltions and ~adopred by the deve(operand·
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. :'. 8mendmei1ts thereto shall' conform in all material respects to this .decislon and
a~,' .. the requirements of the OCC.,
." "::"'~" :,'No perm~~.~use ~'~'Bafr Road as.a.ccess to the Resort 16 giVen or-: F •,', .impJl.ed by this decision.' ' . , ' .. ,"i.;;
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~ 24. Satisfied. Pc
f: &;.: ~. ' , AppIicantlShaH 8UbmIt '8 detalk.d erosion COntrol plan with ~~TentatIVe Plat
~,' , 'or Site plan. whlchevercomea'fitst..' ': :', ,.'" .
j, ~~. " LOl'~~"WidIh (fro~e)"cov~. off~t'Paftang a~"~.including:
solar setbacks. 8le permitted as described 1rt Applicanfs Exhibit 8, 8-24,8 In the
, burden of Proof doct.ttnoot. subje<lt to review dudn,g ,,the, 8U~approval
" '. " " ,pr0ce&8'to confinn Ihat there will be safe W.hlde access to each lot· ~
" ,,' . ,with·tf'!e dfmensfonaJ standards shSA be eotifirmed dli:fnQ subdMsicm approval for
eadl development phase. NJ muld-family uniis, coinm8rcial Sindwes, and oth«
... ! ; : -resort facilities 8AJ ~from meeUng the solar setback. standards.:" Lt,
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Road width m.aB be col1srsiem with t!Je requfrements ..forth in the County's .
. ' subdiVisrott ord~nce.·IJ.CC Chap~1'~.36. '. . . .' '. . '" .. .~ , .
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28.
· . .
" .,' . 29:· . Applicant ·.~II abt~ at all times W!U\.the,MOU·witfl COOT. regarding required
.' "'imProvements al'!d ContribUtions to' Impr.ovements·. an' OooT administered
. . roaCSways'(Agt'eel)'lent Numb9r22759, da\ed 1.0110105)..'" . ." .. '.. . . .
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. '., ·30:'·,· Satisfied.'
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32. No ~nnrSslon to instaO helicopter landing zone.(heffpad)·iIt:th& Resort is given Or
.', ::im~bythisdecisJon ' , '" ,.:., ,". ' .
...,:.,,:~/ "The'~~~~~' m~·flm·~888.~~'ihe~_:'.',.: :~.
<.. :," .',' :"". ~,,' At·~·100"M~~~t8bl~Unft8.for,vI8ftor~ntedlodg~·
....,.. .' . ',' '. '. B.' . VJs«or-oriented e8ting establ!ilhinen18 far at,.1east 100 ~na and
" .,', '. .... '., . meeting ~\vfliCh .~e:e.atlng for at least 100~8. , , ...' ...... c: '. ,The aggrag. 0D;It of fJevelopiAfr·1he,.ovemIght k:IdgIng ~\
Ii .....,," , . j. ~,~.' eaUng ~~nts and' meetfr~,.·roorris required in'
. .'. '." .': DeC' ~O:11~;OOO. (A) ;(1), and'(2) shall be·at 1east··$2,OOP.OOO [Ul
. '; .'<,.' , •• 1984 dollars) . '.. . . . 'f • ...... ':n
'-.. ;' '" : ".D~ '··.·At~I~o~.OOO;O~1_d~)~hi.ii:be'~.rtEin~
. teefdentialfacilitfes . . , .. '. ,:' .. ' . .
" ',,,' '.' E," '.ll'iit ~1tIes and. ~modafiOns re~by DeC 18:'113.060i. must "be pHysically provided or financlaly' ~purs~ to
· DeC ~8,.11~.110 JXi.or:tO. cIoBure of·88Io8.·rentaI or lease Of ~ny
· residential~orlOts:· -:. : :,'.' .... c'.
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34. Where.constructfon disturbs native vegetation In open space arvas that ~..t9 be
. .retained in III subst$ntiaIfy natural. condition, .Applicant 1IhaII restore the native'
.. ' . ; ..' veg'etatiOn. .'l11b nkiUk'ement shall not. apply to land that Is .Improved for ..
recreational uses, such 88 golf courses. hiking or nabn trails or' eques(rlan or
blcycfe paths.' .
35. lhe contract with the ~of units that will, be used for overnIght'lodglng by
the geaiel8I public 'shan contain' language to,ule foIovylng elfect ,UnIt OWner)
$hal make the unit avaUabie to [Thombwgh ResortIbooking agent] for overnight
I'8(daI use by 1he ~.pubRp at ...~~per calendar year··through 8
l .: : central r8servatiort'8nd check-In seMoe.~ .... : . _. ~. '; .. '.•
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::. ,re~ove to ~,~JI.~.safety ~associated wIh·~·resort and
, ·.. ,.·.. lhe~~.P.~.:...........,. ';' '. ','.' ..,' ,
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'37.' Satisfte¢.· " .~ .' .,..... ..-..-. ~
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38. The appUcant shal abide by the April 200S WiIdtife MlttgationPian. the August
2008 StJppIernttnt. and ~with tbe BLM and 'OOFW fpr management of
off-site mitJOation eROftB. Comri&tent with the plan. the 'appI~nf chaO submit an
,annual report to the county ~rng mitigation' ac:tiVitie~1' that have occurred over
, ~previous wear. The mitigation measures 1ncIude renloval ot: eliCistr.g wefts oil
UlIiJ subject property, and coordination with ODFW to model &Imam tempenrtures'
inVVhychusC~~, ';.-. - ' .
,, , 39.' 'Ttte applicant shaH provlde.fundlng to ~e a :~n~~project by.th$'
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./ Thtee'SieteN l~tion"Districfto ~106,aora-teet,of, instteam water to',
',' "mitigate pdtentiaf increase in stream ,~Penrtures "In, Whyc:hu$ Creek. The'
., , appI1cant ehd provide a.QOpv of an agr~t:with the'lrdgatiOll district detailing'f.'!\
1",( funding agreement pior to the oompJetIon, of P~A. ':.: '. . . ',. '" . , .. " ,
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~ '. • I ••' ',:," , Dated ~Jis 6 11 day of October. 2008.
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MaIled tt.is!f!E:.da~of October. 2008.
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, " 1 , nilS DECISION 1$ FINAL UNleSs APPEAi..ED il.\t ACGORDAtiq,E ,WITH TN,E PROy1sl0NS,
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John Kahlie
From: John Kahlie
Sent Wednesday, June 04,20149:27 AM
To: 'david.peterson@tonkon.com'
Cc: kameron@bendcable.com
Subject Thornburgh Resort
Hi David,
In response to our conversation regarding the Thornburgh Resort development, we are providing you with the following
information. Please feel free to forward this email to Deschutes County in support of your Application for initiation of
theCMP.
Our firm, Hickman Williams & Associates, represented Thornburgh Resort Company, llC in the development of
applications for the Conceptual Master Plan, Final Master Plan and Tentative Plans for the Phase A development starting
in the fall of 2004 and continuing well into 2008.
All work performed by Hickman, Williams & Associates on the original submitted applications was in accordance with
the requirements of Title 17 of the Deschutes County Code. Work performed by us included; road design for both
horizontal and vertical alignment, width, and cross section. All design work, including the roads, was based on a detailed
aerial topography flown to two foot contour intervals. Additionally, a color coded "slope analysis" was produced by us
and used to help insure that no site development was proposed on slopes greater than 25%.
Please let me know if you need anything else,
John
John Kahlie, Principal
H W A Engineers. Planners. Surveyors
Hickman, Williams & Associates, Inc.
62930 O. B. Riley Road, Suite 100 • Bend, OR 97701
p541.389.9351 c541.480.8680 f541.388.5416
iohnk@hwa-inc.org
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